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The l iberalization of our i mmigration laws in the U nited States 
appeared to be a priority on the political agenda while President 
George 'vV. Bush weighed proposals to expand access to visas , 1  until 
Professor o f  Law. University o f  Pennsvlvania L a w  School. Copyright© 2003 b y  Howard 
F. Chang. This article is based on the 200 I Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at the Chicago-Kent 
College of Lt\Y. I would like to thank Rcuvcn Avi-Yonah. Samuel Estrc:icher. Richard 
Friedman . Clayton Gil lette. Michncl Hc:llet·. Marcel Knhan. Thomas N;tgcl. Richard Revcsz. 
and seminar participants at Harvard University. the Universitv of California at Davis. the 
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terrorist attacks placed these plans on hold .c D emocrats i n  Congress 
urged even broader liberalization than that contemplated by the Bush 
administration.' Support from both labor unions and business 
interests may make liberalizing reforms politically feasib le i n  the near 
future,� as the Bush administration bas resumed negotiations with 
Mexico on immigration policy with the support of D e mocrats i n  
Congress." This retreat from the  overwhelmingly restrictionist  pol i tics 
of recent years bas been a welcome development, as considerations of 
not only national economic welfare but also social justice mil itate in  
favor of  liberalized access for aliens seeking employment in  the 
United States.  
After all , our immigration restrictions are a form of government 
mandated employment discrimination against aliens.  O ur immigra­
tion statute prohibits the hiring of aliens not authorized to work in  the 
U nited States and imposes sanctions on employers violating this 
prohibit ion.6 Aliens are authorized to work here , for the most part, 
only i f  they have a ··green card," that is ,  are legal immigrants, or are 
temporary workers with nonimmigrant visas . 7  Our immigration laws 
not only impose quantitative restrictions on the number of these visas 
issued but also impose requirements for access to those visas that no 
native would have to meet in order to work in the U nited States.:-: 
Even if our laws did not include an exp licit ban on the hiring of 
unauthorized immigrants, the threat of enforcement of o ur immigra-
J!igmnls. N.Y. Ti\I ES . .r ulv 2-f. 200 I .  at A I :  Eric Schmitt. Hush SilL\ !'/an ji11· fnunigrunls Could 
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1111 f111111igmriun f'olitT. N.Y. TiwiFS. Aug. 10. 2lllll. at A-f. 
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Worker Rig/1/s Addressed. L.A. Tii\IES. Aug. 3. 21Hll. at AI: Eric Schmitt. Democrurs Counter 
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tion laws, through the exclusion and deportat ion of aliens, would 
prevent or curtail alien access to employment opportuniti es in our 
labor markets. Thus, our immigration laws are a substantial barrier 
to the free flow of alien labor into the U ni ted States . 
For example, we require ' ' labor certification" for most categories 
of employment-based immigration visas, including those for skilled 
workers, even workers holding advanced degrees . �  Labor certifica­
tion requires,  among other things, that the employer show that ·' there 
are not sufficient workers who are able, will ing, qualified . . .  and 
available" to perform the work in questioG. 111 By "qualified , '' our 
i mmigration laws generally mean minimally qualified. 1 1  Thus, our 
laws mandate that employers choose any minimally qualified U.S .  
worker over any better qualified alien . 12 Through our immigration 
laws, we deny aliens access to valuable employment opportunit ies 
that are open to natives. At a fundamental level, these laws are at 
odds with antidiscrimination principles we take for granted in other 
contexts. 13 
This government mandated employment d iscrimination is espe­
cially striking given the basis for the discrimination. Most aliens are 
born aliens because our nat ionality laws deem them to be aliens 
based on immutable characteristics, i ncludi ng the geographic location 
of their birth and the cit izensh ip of their parents at the time of their 
birth . 1� For a liberal society that declares that "all men are created 
equal,"1:; this discrimination , based expl icitly on ci rcumstances of 
Y M s� ll53(b)(2)-(3). llt'2(<1)(S)(D). 
!0. M S l lt'2(a)(5)(A)(i). 
ll .  The statute requires the U.S. worker to be "equally q ualified . . only in the case of an 
alien who .. is a member of the teaching profession .. or "has exception<li ability in the sciences or 
the arts.·· !d. s 11S2(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
12. Set> STEPHEN H. LEGO'viSKY. hHvtlGkATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY I�) (2J 
ed. I 997 )  (" [T]he employer ordinarily must hire a minimally qualified American ov<Cr a mt>re 
q ualified alien (or hire no one at nll) ... ) . 
13. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2 (2000). 
1-L See U.S. CONST amend. XIV. s l ('·AJI persons born . .  in the Unilt:d States. and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof. are citizens of the United States . . .... ):::-; U.S.C. s 1401 (2000) 
(setting forth categories of ··citizens of the United States at birth .. ) . 
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As the locus of this <1rtick 
is an eva l uation of U.S. immigration polic ies . my analvsis examines the tension be t \\ een these 
policies and the ideals of equality and neutrality that we generally espouse in the Uniicd States 
\Vi thin our liberal political philosophv. I do not address the question of whether othet· societie::; 
must also live by the same principles to which we arc committee!. as that issu·� is bc\·ond the 
scope of this article. See Joseph H. Carcns. Mignuiun and ;'v/omlitL !\ Lihcm! Lguliwnun 
Pcr.\pl'c!ive. in FkEE iv!OVEiv!E:'-iT: ETrliC:\L ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL. :VI!CI\ATIO'; Of 
PEOPLE Ai\D OF MONEY 25. 36--+0 (!3rian !3arrv 8.: Robc.-rt E. Goodin eds .. 1 992) [hcrcin;ti'ler 
2l)../ CHICAGO-KENT L!\ W REVIDV [Vol7(;:2l)l 
birth, is at odds with ideal pr inciples of social justiceY' Our liberal 
ideals raise a presumption i n  favor of equal treatment and place the 
burden on those who defend  discrimination to come forward with a 
justification for d iscriminatory laws. 
The discrimination based on  nativity in our nat ionality laws 
would be less important if it were a simple matter for an alien to gain 
permanent residence in the U nited States and then naturalize .  Once 
an alien immigrates and gains lawful permanent res idence, the alien 
becomes a U.S .  worker wi th  access to the U.S. labor market and 
eventually access to U .S .  c i t izenshipY Our immigration laws, how­
ever, raise significant barri ers to immigration and thereby deny the 
vast majority of aliens access to the employment opportunities 
provided to U .S .  natives as a b irthright. Insofar as these hurdles 
prevent most aliens who desire such access from enjoying the oppor­
tunities open to U .S .  natives, they discriminate against those who are 
born aliens in favor of those natives. The more restrictive our immi­
gration and naturalization  policies ,  the more significance they confer 
on nationality at birth ,  and the more our laws discrimi nate based on 
circumstances of birth. 
In  Part I of this Articl e ,  I examine our immigration restrictions in 
light of our liberal ideals of e quality. I argue that these ideals require 
us to extend equal concern to  al l  individuals and that this cosmopoli­
tan perspective makes it d i fficult to j ustify our immigration restric­
tions. This violation of the principle of equal concern represents one 
sense in which immigration restrictions violate our l ibera l  ideals .  
In Part IL I assume a less demanding moral theory ,  which allows 
us to give the interests of natives priority over the interests of aliens .  
I argue that even from th is paroch ial perspective . i t  is difficult  to 
justify the employment d iscrimination implied by our immigration 
restrictions as ideal policies unless we count the satisfaction of 
segregationist preferences as a j ust ificat ion.  The role of intolerance 
in explaining the adoption of immigration restrictions underscores the 
second sense in which the emp loyment discrimination impli ed  by our 
immigration policies violates our l iberal ideals. 
FREE iV!OVEI\IENT] (asking whether other countries arc obliged to have the samt: immigration 
policies as the United States). 
16. See Howard F. Chang. fm111igrutiun !'olin·. Liherul Princi{IID. 1!1!1! Ilu: Rcpuhliwn 
Traditiun. �5 GEO. L.J. 2105.2112-15 ( 1l)l)7). 
17. Ser X U.S.C. � 1427(a) (2000) (providing for nalllralization of permanent resident 
aliens). 
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I n  Part I I I ,  I explore the normative implications of my analysis 
for the reform of our immigration policies .  I conclude that it is 
difficult for us to justify employment discrimination against a l iens 
from a l iberal perspective, whether we adopt the cosmopolitan 
perspective or a less egal i tarian perspective that allows us to favor the 
interests of nat ives over those of al iens.  The interests of natives, 
however, may justify some restrictions on al ien access to publ ic 
benefits and to citizenship , which would suggest l iberalized guest­
worker programs as a component of immigration reform. These 
programs would not be ideal from the cosmopoli tan l iberal perspec­
tive, but then neither would our curren t  immigration restrictions. I 
argue that guest-worker programs would represent a non-ideal ,  
second-best improvement over the status quo from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, given constraints that make more ideal  policies pol i tica lly 
infeasible. Final ly,  in Part IV, I offer some concluding remarks. 
I. THE LIBERAL IDEAL AND THE COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE 
Consider the l iberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls, 
who asks what principles people would choose behind a "vei l  of 
ignorance . " 1 x  In  this "original posit ion," people know nothing about 
their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not know how 
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they 
are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerat ions . " 1Y This  condit ion ensures that the parties are ·'fairly 
situated and treated equally as moral persons,"��� or as Ronald 
Dworkin describes, extends "equal concern and respect" to each 
individuaP1 
Using Rawls' theory, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immi­
gration restrictions as a question of social justice .'' In  seeking a 
justification for the exclusion of aliens, "we don't want to be biased 
by self- interested or partisan considerat ions" and instead "can take i t  
as a basic presupposit ion that we should treat al l  human beings, not 
just members of our own society, as free  and equal moral persons ."'� 
11\. See JOHl\" RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13fi-42 (1971). 
I 9. Jd. at 13fi-37: see id. at 141 ("'If a knowledge of particulars is allowed. then the uutwmc 
is biased by arbitrary contingencies ..
. 
) 
20. !d. at 141. 
21. ROl\"ALD DWORKIN. T AKI'IG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 100-X I ( ILJ77). 
22. See Joseph H. Carens. !\liens and Ciri::.ens: The Case .fi>r Opr:n /Jon/as. -1-LJ REV. POL. 
25l. 255 (1987). 
23. /d. at 256. 
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Carens identifies this premise as a basic feature of all l iberal  poli tical 
theories ."4 concluding that we should " take a globa l, not  a n ational, 
view of the original posit ion. ''"' 
If we begin with equal concern for al l  persons, then immigration 
barriers are morally suspect and demand j ustification. All immigra­
tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their 
alienage. which in  turn derives from immutable characterist ics such as 
birthplace ( that is ,  national origin) and other circumstances of birth 
such as parentage."li National origin would appear to be a trait  that 
Rawls should deem "arb i trary from a moral point of view."27 Carens 
concludes that we cannot j ustify restrictions "on the grounds that 
those born in  a given territory or born of parents who were citizens 
were more entitled to the benefits of c i tizenship than those born 
elsewhere or of alien parents. "2x Nor can we j ustify restrictions "on 
the grounds that immigration would reduce the economic wel l-being 
of current citizens. "::Y Simi larly, in a utilitarian calculation of global 
welfare . "current citizens would enj oy no privileged position."31' 
A. Immigration Restrictions and Global Economic Welfare 
Suppose we adopt the perspective of a global uti l itarian and thus 
give equal weight to the welfare of each individual in the world.  Can 
we then j ustify the employment d iscrimination mandated by our 
immigration laws'? Perhaps this unequal treatment for aliens is 
somehow consistent with equal concern for the interests of each 
individual .�1 An economic analysis of the welfare effects of immigra-
2-l. See id. at 205 (claiming that .. our social institutions and public policies must respect a l l  
humGn beings a s  moral persons ... which . .  entail s  recognition ... o f  the freedom and equality of 
every human being"): S£:"<' u/so id. at 2hY ( .. No moral argument will seem acceptable ... if it 
clircctlv chal lenge> the assumption of the equal moral worth of a l l  individuals ... ) . 
:'5. /d. at :'56. 
2fl. See Roger Nett. The Ci�·i/ Righi \Ve Are Nul Reutll· For: The Righi of Free J\1/ovel!lt'lll of 
Pl'l!ple on thf' fitce of the Earth. 1> l ETHICS 212. 224 ( llJ7l) ("'May we expect the lesson which 
the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be repeated on a 
broader scale. with the underprivileged of the earth demanding ·desegregation' of nation 
swtcs·'"). 
?.7. R-\\\LS. supru note 11-1. at 72. 
2�. Carcns. st:jJFU nC'llL' .�2. i.1l 261. 
2'-J. /d. d t 2h2. 
30. !d. ilt :'6:'> ( .. [Tjhc: utilitarian cummitment to moral equality is reflected in the 
�1ssumption tint ever1·onc i> tu c:uunt fur (lJ1C and no one fur more than one when utility is 
cdcui<Jtcc.i. . . i 
31 As D'.':orkin e\plnins ... the: right to tu'otl!tenlm on equal" docs not necessarily imply a 
"right to eqtut! trt'uinit'n(· in the allocation of a particul<�r opportunity. DWORKT"i. SllfJUI note 
21. at 227. 
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tion restrictions, however, indicates that  these barriers to labor 
migration not only reduce global wealth but also increase inequality 
in  its distribution worldwide.  These barriers are neither economically 
efficient nor equitable .  
Consider the economic effects of labor migration in  world labor 
markets. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage countries 
to h igh-wage countries in  pursuit of higher wages. As a result of this 
migration, world output rises. H igher wages in  the host country imply 
that the marginal product of labor is  higher there than in the source 
country. That is, higher wages for the same worker mean that the 
worker produces more value in the host country than in the source 
country. Labor migration generally leads to net gains in wealth for 
the world as a whole,  because labor flows to the country where it has 
the higher value useJ? An efficient global l abor market would allow 
labor to move freely to the country where i t  earns the highest return . 
Market forces would thus direct labor to the market where its mar­
ginal product is h ighest .  For this reason, economic theory raises a 
presumption in favor of the free movement of labor. 
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor inter­
nationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of  labor to 
diverge widely among different countries .�� For any given class of 
labor, residents of h igh-wage countries could gain by employing more 
immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain by 
selling more of their labor to employers in high-wage countries .  
Immigration restrict ions distort the global labor market. producing a 
misallocation o f  labor among countries ,  thereby wasting human 
resources and creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant 
countries. 
The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger 
the distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restric­
tions, and the larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor 
migration. Given the large international differences in wages. i t  
should be  apparent that  the potential gains from liberalized labor 
migration ( and the costs that the world bears as a result of immigra­
tion barriers) are huge . In fact, some economists have atte mpted to 
32. See PAuL R. KRuC;�v!Af\: & MAURICE 0BSTFELD. l'iTER:'\ATiOl\.-'\L EC0:\0\i!CS: 
THEORY Al\D POLICY 158-5l) (2cl eel. llJ'-Jl). 
33. Sl.'e Ml'.ticun Deporii.'<'S Reporr Good Trmrmcnr. UP!. ;'\pril 21. llJlJ6. m·ui!uh!e dl 
LEXIS. Nexis Library. UP! Fi le  (reporting tha t Mexican immigrants rccc:i\ccl an a'.·cr�tgc of 
$278 per week in the United States. compared with $30.1\l per week in i'vlexico). 
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estimate the gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing migra­
t ion. These studies suggest  that the gains to the world economy from 
removing immigration barriers could well be enormous and greatly 
exceed the gains from removing trade barriers. For example,  Bob 
Hamilton and John Whalley provide a range of estimates based on 
various assumptions about critical parameters, but a l l  of their  esti­
mates suggest that the potential gains are largeY Many of their 
estimates suggest that the gains from free migration of labor would 
more than double worldwide real income .35 Even their most conserva­
tive estimate suggests that the gains would be a significant fraction 
(more than 13 percent) of worldwide real income .36 Furthermore, 
their analysis indicates that the free migration of labor would also 
greatly improve the global distribution of income by r aising real 
wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers .37 
Given these welfare effects, the employment discrimination im­
plied by immigration restrictions are difficult to defend in terms of 
the cosmopolitan liberal ideal .  This ideal would extend the principle 
of equal concern expressed by R awls' origina l  position to all p ersons. 
Carens and others conclude from these liberal premises that "we have 
an obligation to open our borders much more ful ly than we do now. "3s 
B. 1 ustice and the Alien 
Some theorists have questioned the application of Rawls' ongi­
nal  position to the in ternat ional context. Rawls himself assumes that 
the ''boundaries" of his principles "are given by the notion of a self­
contained national community. "39 James Woodward argues i n  favor 
of applying Rawls' framework to inhabitants of a particular country 
rather than globally.411 Similarly, S tephen Perry notes that the scope 
of the original position is l imited to persons within a single society, 
34. See Bob Hami lton & Joh n  Whal lev. Efficiency and Disniburional Jmplicarions of 
G/ohul Reslriuions on Lobour J'vlohiliry. 14 J. DEY. ECON. 61 (1984). 
35. Set' id. a t  70. 
3o. Sceid.at7 1-72. 
37. See hi. at 73-74. 
38. Carens. SllfHII note 22. at 270. Carens condemns i mm igra t ion restrict ions:  ""Like feudal 
b arrie rs to mobili tv. thcv protc:ct un just  privi lege ... !d. S im i lar lv .  Bruce Ackerman concludes 
t h at i mmigra t ion barri ers are i nconsi s t e n t  w i th l ibe ral principles:··] cannot just i fy my power to  
exclude vm1 without destroying mv own cla im to me mbersh ip i n  an idt:al l i bcral  s tate ... BRUCE 
A AOTR\IAi\. SOCir\L JUSTICE If\: THE LiBER,\L STXfE 93 ( 1980). 
39. RAWLS. SllfJ/"11 note 18. at 457. 
41l. James Woodward . Colltnlcnrun: fj/Jemlistnond i\1/igrlllion. in FREE MOVEiviENT. l"llfJ/"11 
note 15. at 59.75: sec id. a t  75-81. 
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which Rawls defines as "'a cooperative venture for mutual advan­
tage."'41 Citing Rawls' defin it ion, Perry argues that "[t)he original 
posit ion i s  not appropriately employed [to create a situation i n  which] 
the parties al l  live in  d ifferent countries or societies and do not know 
which one i s  theirs. "42 
The first problem with Perry's argument i s  that it raises the ques­
tion of whether a world in which countries engage in international 
trade in goods, services, capital, and labor i s  a "cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage. '"-!' If  so, then the world i s  a "society" i n  which 
al l  ind ividuals would be parties to the original  posit ion.44 U nder this 
theory ,  by choosi ng to cooperate, we take on obligations of j ustice 
toward one another. 
There is, however, a deeper problem inherent in  making obliga­
t ions of justice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation . This 
approach allows us to avoid obl igations of j ustice by refusing to 
cooperate with disfavored groups. If we impose a boycott or embargo 
against al iens, then we owe them no explan ation in terms of j ustice. 
This approach reconci les d iscrimination against aliens with egalitarian 
principles of social  j ustice only by fiat: i t  assumes the result rather 
than deriving i tY 
We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do 
not cooperate with al iens. As the example of  immigration pol icy 
demonstrates . the question of which individuals we choose as partners 
in cooperation is  itself  an open question of public pol icy that we may 
want to answer using our principles of j ustice. If we make obligations 
of justice contingent on whether we cooperate in the first p lace , then 
this normative framework becomes a function of  our pol icies and 
cannot work as an independent standard that we can use to evaluate 
these polic ies .  Our analysis becomes circular: we are justified i n  
d iscriminating against aliens i n  employment precisely because our 
41. Stephen R .  Pcrrv. lnunigriliinn . .lusrice, and Culwre. in JLSTICE IN 11'..-IMIGRATION 9-+. 
107 (Warren F. Schwartz cJ . . 199.5) (quoting RAWLS . . wpm note 10. at .:I) . 
.:12. !d . 
.:13. See CHARLES BEITZ. POLITICAl_ THEORY AND lNTERNATIOl"AL RELATIONS 143-.53 
( 197Y) (arguing that ,;ufficient COLlperation and i n teraction exi,;ts among nations to justify a 
glulxd view of the original pusition) . 
.:1.:1. Sec Thomas M. Scanlon. Jr . . Ri711'1.1 · Tile orr of.!usriu:. 121 U. PA. L. REV . I ll2U. I Ohfl-fi 7 
(IY73) (arguing that .. considerations of justice apply at least wherever there is svstematic 
c·connmic interaction .. and therefore:: Rawls' principles of justice "apply to the world economic 
system taken <b a \lhok") . 
.:1.5. Thus. critics of this appro::�ch complain that ir is .. an arbitra:-v move which cannot be 
ddcndcd ll'ilhin !he rhenrv ... BRI.-\0: BARRY. THE LifHcR.-\L THEORY OF .I USTICE 129 (I 1)73 ). 
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refusal to hire them relieves us of obl igations of justice . S uch a theory 
begs the question of whether our choice of partners is itself j ustifi­
able .�" 
Only the global interpretation of the original posit ion offers a 
satisfactory framework for the evaluation of our immigration pol icies 
under a l iberal egalitarian theory of j ustice . This cosmopolitan 
perspective is the only interpretation of the original  position that is 
faithful to ' ' the underlying spirit of Rawls'  theory , "  which " is ani­
mated by the underlying idea of e liminat i ng or compensat ing for 
'morally arbi trary' d ifferences between people.  "�7 Cosmopolitan 
l iberals note that " the fact that one is  an inhabitant of one particular 
country rather than another . . .  i s  a paradigmatic example of the sort 
of 'morally arbitrary' fact that the method of the origina l  position is 
designed to abstl'act from. "�� To restrict the scope of our theory of 
j ustice based on such moral ly arbi trary facts undermines our claim to 
a liberal egali tarian theory of justice. 
Nevertheless, Woodward seeks to j ustify this restriction on the 
original position by pointing to "real world facts about people ' s  actual 
mo tivation and non-ideal behaviour ."�Y He notes that "very extensive 
immigration rights . . .  are not rights that people in affluent countries 
would be motivated to act in accordance with or to respect,  once they 
take up their places in such societies' '  and concludes that 
" [r]ecognizing this ,  the parties to a global contract would not agree to 
such rights. "51 1 These political r
-
eal i ties, Woodward argues,  constrain 
the theory of j ustice that emerges from the original posit ion. 
Woodward 's appea l  to realism, however, confuses the ideal  and 
non-ideal parts of a theory of j ustice. Rawls explains that his "main 
concern ·· i s  with the ideal theory, which "assumes strict compliance" 
and describes "a  perfectly j ust basic s tructure" under "favorable 
circumstances .  " 5 1  " Existing institutions are to be j udged in light of 
-l h .  Thus. th.: fact that cooperat ion is feas ib le should be  sufficient  t o  requ i re t h e  inc lusion 
u r  a prospective party to the origina l  posi t ion .  See Charles Be i tz. Cosmopoliwn Ideals and 
.V, ; rirm,i/ Smrimenr.  XO J. PH I L. 5 9 l .  505 ( 1 983 ) ( a rguing that otherwise. " l im i t ing the scope or 
th.: principks to nat ional  societies on the grounds that i n ternat iona l  cooper8t ion clues not exist  
todav . . . would a rbitrar i lv favor the sta tus quo") .  
-l' vVoodwarcl. SIIJ!ra note -W. at SO-S l .  In th i s  sense. Rawls ·  fa i l ure to extend h i s  
pri nc ipks g loha l lv  i s  - -an wl lwc move . . .  i nconsistent wi th  the underlying ega l i ta r· ian sp ir i t"  of  
h i :.; thcorv. /d .  at 76. 
-f:-:. Jd. �I ( 70. 
-llJ. ! d. 
5 ( l. /d. 
5 1 .  KA W LS .  supru note [ X .  at 245 . 
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this conception and held to be unj ust to the extent that they depart 
from it  without sufficient reason. "52 The non-ideal theory " is worked 
out after an ideal  conception of j ustice has been chosen; only then do 
the parties ask which principles to adopt under less h appy condi­
tions. "53 The non-ideal t heory takes account of "historical contingen­
cies" and " injustice" in  existing social arrangements.54 Thus, if we 
understand our project as the formulation of an ideal theory, then the 
popularity of policies deemed unj ust under that theory is no reason to 
revise our theory to uphold those pol icies instead. 
If  we apply Woodward's approach to our ideal theory of j ustice, 
then we make the theory vulnerable to capture by popular prejudice 
and undermine its capacity for a critical evaluation of the status quo. 
By taking actual non-ideal  behavior as given. Woodward imparts a 
conservative bias to the original position .  Carrying this approach to 
i ts logical conclusion, we would conclude that the parties to the 
original position could only endorse existing arrangements.  Such an 
ideal theory would fai l  to serve i ts function, which is to provide a 
standard by which to j udge existing insti tutions.  
Carens suggests that a "real ist ic" approach to morality in 
seventeenth-or eighteenth-century America "would perhaps have led 
one to art iculate a moral i ty for s laveho lders, rather than cal l ing into 
quest ion the institution of slavery and demanding i ts  abolit ion. "'' He 
notes that "any moral view of slavery was flawed and inadequate i f  i t  
did not start from the recognit ion that sl avery was fundamental ly evil  
and unj ust" and that " [a )ny satisfactory moral view had to have 
abolit ion as i ts  u l timate goal . ' ' 5h A realist account would be flawed 
and unsatis factory in two possible senses .  First ,  Carens may mean 
that i t  would simply fai l  to describe moral truth and therefore would 
be a false moral theory. Second, a real ist  accoum might be inade­
quate because it would fai l  to advance the cause of j us tice over the 
long term. That is .  by legit imating the status quo. the realist vvould 
fa i l  to promote more enl ightened attitudes and thus would sta l l  
progress toward more j ust  policies .57 I n  co ntrast . " [a ] pproach ing  
5 2. !d. a t  2-lh. 
5.1. !d. at ::>L�--Ih. 
5-1. !tl. a t  2-16. 
::> ::> .  J ose ph H. Ca r.:ns. 1\cu/istic und fdmlisric Approuchc:: ; , ,  lht' f:.'thics of ;\ligm:i,n. -, ( )  
{ '\ l . L  iVI I G R.ATIOi\ REV.  ! 5n .  ! (i-1 ( l L)% ) .  
5C1. M a t l n5 .  
57 .  I n  the i m m igrat iun context.  !'or exampl e: .  Lou i s  1\' ! iciud S•:HJ m n n  u r;•:s U '  tll . ,, ,;, , i;J 
furt h e r  �;t rengthening t he h a n d  of t h ose: whn \I Oulcl d c fc; cd ,_' \ C ! u,;j ,· ,n < > nd h • u n c!cd 
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moral questions from an idealistic perspective avoids legitimating 
policies and practices that are morally wrong and gives the fullest 
scope to our critical capacit ies ."" 
If  we allow the realist perspective to displace our ideals ,  then we 
breed complacency regarding the morality of the status quo .  Robert 
Goodin suggests that morality may sometimes require u s  to advocate 
" unrealistic" options: 
[I ]f the only reason the options are unrea listic is  that people are 
unwill ing to m a ke sacrifices that they could and arguably s h o ul d  in 
pursuit o f  morally important goals,  then those options should b e  
very m uch on the t a b l e .  T h e  proper r o l e  o f  pol itics, i n  such circum­
stances, is precisely not to 'be real istic'  and accept uncrit ical ly  peo­
ple's unwill ingness to m ake morally proper sacri fices.  I t  is ,  rather, 
to persuade them that moral  ideals  are worth pursuing.5Y 
In this sense , according to Carens, " ideal theory holds up the princi­
ple of free migration as an essential par t  of the j ust  social order 
toward which we should strive. ' ' !ill 
Woodward objects that "as we abstract away from real world 
facts . . .  the relevance of the ( ideal)  principles and institutions that 
would emerge from such an idealized origina l  position to what vl"e 
should do in the actual non-ideal world . . .  becomes progressively less 
clear. "" 1  He asks what this ideal theory implies "about how n ations 
should behave in the actual world, which is very far from conforming 
to these ideal arrangements? ""2 Woodward is right to ask what 
practical implications this ideal  theory h as for our non-ideal world 
even if he is  wrong to suggest that we should rej ect an  ideal  theory 
because it  is unrealistic. What good are the prescriptions of ideal 
theory if there is no real chance that we would actually adopt the 
prescribed policies? With Woodward's question in mind ,  let  us next 
turn to the perspective that he might consider more relevant from a 
realist perspective. 
Louis Michae l  Seidman.  Feor u!l(/ Lour/zing 111 r/z e Brmlt:r. in J USTI CE I N  I M "I IC RATION.  supru 
no te -+ L  a t 1 40: set' id. at 1 4 1  (cri ticiz ing a rguments t h a t  "provide a mmuni t i o n  for ddcnckrs o f  
exclusion and  apologists for t h e  sta tus q uo . " } 
SS.  Carens. supm nuk 55 .  at 1 67 .  
5 9 .  Robert  E .  Good i n .  Con1menlu1T: Tlze Poliricul Reulism uf Free ivlO \'t'! l lel ll .  i11 FR E E  
MOV E i\I ENT. Sllf!ut no te 1 5 .  at 24:'\ .  25-f .  
6 0 .  Ca rc ns . supra nute 22.  at 2h2 . 
6 1 .  Woodward. supra note -fll. at 7 7 .  
62. !d. 
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Our immigration l aws are usually j ustified based on an assump­
tion that we may privilege individuals born into those favored classes 
entit led to U.S .  citizenship upon birth under our national i ty l aws .63 
Thus ,  the discrimination explicit in our l aws derives from an implicit 
assumption regarding the unequal status of persons based on nativity. 
This assumption is one sense in which our immigration and national­
ity laws violate our ideals of equal concern for al l  persons. 
There is also a second sense, however, in  which these l aws violate 
our l iberal ideals .  To i l lustrate this point,  consider the fol lowing 
thought experiment.  For the sake of argument,  suppose we grant the 
premise that we are entit led to favor the i nterests of n atives over 
those we designate as al iens based on circumstances of birth. I adopt 
this nativist perspective strictly as a theoretical exercise, not because I 
believe that our immigration pol icies should be guided solely by the 
interests of natives, but because such concerns have in  fact played a 
dominant role in the public debate over immigration pol icy and are 
commonly thought to provide the strongest case in favor of restrictive 
immigration laws. 
We might adopt this nativist perspective as a concession to polit i­
cal realit ies .64 National governments, including that of the United 
States, wil l  l ikely continue to deem the promotion of the interests of 
natives as the paramount objective of immigration po licies .  I t  may be 
polit ically infeasible to ask natives to set aside their col lective self­
interest in formulat ing our immigration laws. This non-ideal feature 
of the rea l  world may impose a constraint on the set of policy a lterna­
tives open to us as a practical matter. 
Furthermore . many observers believe that the pursuit of national 
self-interest is j ust ified as a moral matter.  · 'Real ists find it  morally 
acceptable that we should prefer the interests of our own col lective to 
h3. S<:e. cg . S .  R EY. No.  lJ0-h2. at _, ( l lJ03 ) ( " [T] hc paramount  obl iga ti on of any nat ion 's  
gove r n m e n t .  incked the v e r y  r e a s o n  f<lr i ts ex i stence unci t he J US t ifica tion for i t s  power .  i s  to 
promo te the n a t ional  intc rt: s t - the long-te rm we l fare ll f t h e majority of i ts  citizens a n d  their  
descendants . . . ) .  
o.+. As Seidman ohsc n·es. the l im i ta t ions i mposed by  "bounded caring [are ] l i k e  i t  or  
not.  . . .  f<ICts that  exi s t in  the  world" and - - u n l i k c l v  to change more than m a rgin a l ly i n  t h e  n c a r  
fut ure .
. . so t h a t  anv - -re a l -world i m m igrat ion policv must . . .  t a ke accou n t  o f  th ese facts a n d  
w o r k  a r u u n d  t h e m  . . .  Sc:idm<ln .  Sllf'm note .'i 7 .  a t  l -+1 1 .  
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those of mankind i n  general . . . . "65 From this standpoint ,  an  analysis 
of the effects of immigration restrictions on the interests of n at ives i s  
directly relevant to the  determination of  the  ideal immigration policy. 
This perspective need not ignore the i nterests of al iens entirely, but 
may justify some discrimination against aliens by giving priority to 
natives. Perry, for example, argues that " [t]here is . . .  an upper l imit 
on the self-sacrifice that l iberal states can demand of their citizens, 
and . . .  this l imit wil l  apply to the treatment of outsiders . "6n Speci fi ­
cally, he suggests that  " [s ] tates  may demand that . . .  immigrants not 
be a burden on society, and even that they be capable of making a 
positive contribution. "n7 
Can we j ustify our immigration restrictions using this criterion? 
In  particular, does the exclusion of al iens mandated by our immigra­
tion laws actually promote the economic interests of n atives, as 
restri ctionists claim? Does the promotion of the economic welfare of 
natives cal l  for these immigration restrictions? The following analysis 
suggests that the answer to these questions, as they are normally 
understood, is no. We would deem our immigration restrictions to be 
ideal publ ic  policies from the perspective of n atives only if we are 
prepared to count the satisfaction of segregationist preferences as 
elements of social welfare . It is in this sense that immigration restr ic­
t ions violate our liberal ideals even if we assume arguendo that 
national welfare is  appropriate as our policy objective . 
A .  Effects of lnwz igration in the Labor Market 
If we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market ,  we 
Ci ncl t hat the na t ives of the h ost country, taken together ,  will gain 
o5. D a vid C. H e ndrickso n .  ;'v!igrwion i n  L u 1 v  l l / 1 ( 1  f:"t!t ics. A Reulist Pcrspecti 1 ·e .  i n  F R E E  
:\l n \ Fi\I EYL supm note: 1 5 .  at 2 1 3 . 2 1 4- 1 5 :  s!'e id. at 223 ( · · [T ]he  collective we l l -being o f  our 
' "' "  s t �i k .  ii ncl uf  t h e  individuals \\ h o  compose i t .  ought tu have a greate r we ight in our moral 
,;cc u u n ting than the we l l -be i ng of those outside the commun i ty . - · ) .  
,.,r:,_ Perry. supm note "� I.  a t  ! 05 .  
67. J r l .  a t  1 09 .  Thus. Perry docs not sugge st  t h at w e  seek to ma:\imizc the benefits deri ved 
h v  nativt:s from i m m igrant,_  Nativcs could ext ract t h e:  maximum benefit from i mmigra n ts by 
i m posing a tar iff on them a nd t hereby ra is ing e x tra tax revc: n ue rrom i m migra n ts .  See Howard 
F. Chang.  L ihcmli:ed !u u n igmtion us Frc•t Tn{(/e: l:"conontic \ Ve!fin-c 111 1 1/  1/te 0etiullll !nnnigm-
· n  ! 'ulic 1 . l -+:i U. PA. L R E V .  l l -+7 .  1 1 57 -;�5 ( 1 997 ) ( anal v1ing th ..: opt imal  t<mlf on immi­
;' rii 1 1'.s.  as';c ;mi n'l thil l na t ives seek to maximize their uwn econo mic w e l fare ) .  The criterion 
Pc1·r-'· suggests wouid not go so far <' S to ck mancl t h e  maximum con t r i bu 1 ion from a n  i m m igra n t :  
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from the immigration of labor."·' \Vages may fall for nat ive workers 
who compete with immigrant labor, but this loss for workers is a pure 
transfer among natives: it is offse t  by an equal gain for those who 
employ labor, and u l timately for consumers, who obtain goods and 
services at lower cost .h° Furthermore, natives gain from employing 
immigrant workers: they gain surplus i n  excess of what they pay 
immigrants for their labor.70 If they did not gain any surplus from 
employing immigrants ,  they would not hire them. Thus, natives as a 
group enjoy a net gain . 7 1  Labor migration represents a form of 
international trade in which the source country exports labor to the 
host country . 72 Like international trade in goods, l abor migration 
allows foreign suppliers to sel l  their services to domestic buyers. 
allowing both parties to enj oy gains from trade as a result of the 
transaction. 
1. Effects on Native \Yorkers: Empirical Evidence 
We may be concerned, of course, with the distribution of income 
among natives. Immigration not only expands wealth,  but also can 
have important distributive effects. Those natives who must compete 
with immigrants in  the labor market may find that immigration 
reduces their real incomeY Thus. countries often restrict immigration 
to protect native workers from the unemployment or the wage 
reductions that the entry of foreign workers would supposedly entai l .  
Studies of the effects of immigration in  U.S.  labor markets .  how­
ever. have shown little evidence of effects on native wages or em-. . � 
6�. Set: N ATI O N A L RESEARCH COUi" C I L  T H E  N EW A C. I E RICAl\S:  ECO'I U � I I C. 
D E� I O G R A P H I C. Al\0 F I S C A L  EFFECTS OF l�Hvi i C R i\TI Ol\ i35-5J (James P. Smith & Barn 
Edmonston eels . . 1 997) [hereinafter N R C] . 
6� See id. at 138-39. 
70. See id. 
7 1 .  George B orps has a ttempted a rough calculat ion o f  the s ize o f  the  surplus en jovc cl b'­
nat ives in the United States as a result  o f  immigra t ion using a vari e ty o f  assumptions. St'c 
George J. Borjas.  The Economic Benefirs Jiom fmmigmrion. J. EC001. P E R S P  . . Spring 1 995 . �1 t 3. 
5. Assuming a homogeneous supply of labor. for example .  Borj as est imates tha t  immigration 
into the United States has produced a surplus o f  �7 bil l ion per year. See id. a t  7 .  Borjas 
describes th i s  amount as "relat ively smal l" comparee! to the size o f  the  U.S .  economy. /d. As 
the N R C  notes. however.  th i s  benefit "remains a sign i ficant posi t ive gain i n  absolute terms" :mel 
remains l arge comparee! to the economic e ffects of most other pub l i c  policies :  " N o t  mJm 
changes i n  pol ic ies would produce benefits as l arge as thil l  number. . .  N R C  supra note 6�.  il t 
1 53 .  Furthermore. i f  these benefits see m  too smal l .  then we can enjov large r gains bY taking i n  
more immigrants and  thereby incrt:<ls ing the immigration s urpl u> .  
72. See Howard F .  Chang. A1igmrion us fnll:'l'l lil lionul Trude: Tizl' Econoll lic Guins /i'unz r/ze 
Liheruli::.ed Mm e111enr of Lohor. 3 UCLA J. l NT'L L & FORE I G N  AFF. 3 7 1  ( 1 99�-99 ) .  
73. See N RC supru note  6 8 .  at  1 38-40. 
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ployment.n A survey of th is empirical l i terature indicates that 
immigration h as a weak effect on the employmen t  of nativesY 
Furthermore , the evidence indicates a weak relationship between 
nat ive wages and immigration across al l  types of n ative workers, 
white or black, skilled or unskil led. 7" 
Why do immigrants h ave so little adverse impact on the wages 
and employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for l abor 
does not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immi­
grant workers not only supply labor, for example ,  they also demand 
goods and services, and this demand will  translate into greater 
demand for locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can offset 
the effect of increased supply. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants 
and natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market .77 Thus . 
immigrants often do not compete for the same jobs as natives. 
Indeed, immigrant labor can be a complement rather than a substi­
tute for native labor, so that an increase in the supply of immigrant 
labor will increase the demand for native labor and thus have positive 
effects on native workers ra ther than negative effects. In fact, l abor 
markets are highly segregated,  with immigrant labor concentrated in 
some occupations while natives are concentrated in  others.7·' 
If only immigrant workers take certain jobs, then natives can 
gain from immigration in  these markets without any adverse effect on 
the wages of native workers. Moreover, if nat ive workers can move 
into jobs where their competitive advantage ( in English language 
skil ls ,  for example) provides a natura l barrier to competition from 
immigrants, then they can enjoy the benefi ts of immigration and sti l l  
avoid any adverse effects of immigration in the labor market .  Thus, 
segmented labor markets imply that immigration can produce gains 
for natives in the labor market without necessarily producing adverse 
effects for native workers. 
74.  See id. 
75. See, e.g . . George J. B orj as.  Th e Econo111 ics of !mmigruriun . 32 J. E C O N .  L IT. 1 667. 1 690 
( 1 994):  Rachel M .  Friedbe rg & Jennifer Hunt .  T/w lmpucr o( l11 1 1 1 1 igrunrs on !1011 Cuunrrr 
Wages, Emplovmenr und GroiVril . J. E C O N .  PERSP . . Spring 1 995.  a t  23. 42:  N R C .  supru note 60. 
a t  223 . 
7f>. See. e.g . . George J. Borjas .  supm note: 7 5 .  at 1 697: Friedberg & H u n t .  supm note 7 5 .  a t  
4 2 :  N RC. supru note 6 0 .  a t  223 . 
77.  Sel:' Jean B aldwin G rossman. The Suh.\ ltllllllhilir\· of Nurives { 1 1 / { /  lnunigmnrs in 
Pruducrion. 64 REV.  ECON. & ST.-\T. 596 ( 1 90 2 ) .  
7 S .  S e e  N R C .  supru note 6 0 .  at  2 1 0 . 
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It is important to interpret claims in the l iterature in light of the 
empirical evidence of segmented labor markets. For example, 
George Borj as ,  Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz produce one of 
the largest estimates of the effect of immigrants on native wages.70 
They estimate that immigration between 1 980 and 1995 accounted for 
44 percent of the 1 1  percent decline i n  the relative wages of high 
school dropouts in the Uni ted S tates during this period .xli Those who 
advocate restrictive immigra tion policies h ave seized upon this study 
to support their claims of adverse effects on unskilled n at ive workers, 
and its conclusions have therefore been widely cited by restrictionists 
in current debates over immigration reform.x t Yet at most ,  the study 
suggests that immigration restrictions benefit the shrinking minority 
of native workers with less than a high school education.x2 
More important, this study uses a questionable methodology. 
Borj as ,  Freeman, and Katz derive their estimates from a simulation 
that assumes that unskilled immigrants are peJfect substitutes for 
unskilled natives .x' That is, this simulation makes an extreme assump­
tion regarding the single most important fact in dispute. Therefore, 
simulations based on this assumption are biased in favor of finding 
large effects on natives, and thus at best provide only an upper bound 
on the potential effect of immigration on the wages of  unskilled 
na tives .x-i 
7LJ. S!"e George J. Borps et a ! . .  flmv Much Do lmmigniliun und Tmd!" A tf.,u !_uhor Murk!'! 
Outcon 1 e.1 ./ .  in S R OOK INC �S  PAI'ERS  ECON. A CTI VITY. No .  I. at I ( Wi l l i am C. Bradlancl & 
George C. Perry eds .. l LJLJ7 ) .  
:-:u. See id. at :'i3 .  62. 
:-: 1 .  The restrictionist Center for I mmigration S t ud i es ("CIS") .  for example.  c i tes th is  study 
m i ts own paper crit icizing immigration from Mexico. See STEVE N  A. CA:VIA ROTA. 
I ivl ivt i G R.A.TION FROivl MEXICO: ASSESS ING THE l iv!PACT ON TH E UNITED STATES 22  (20ll l )  
(c i t ing the est imates by Borjas . Freeman.  and Katz t o  support h i s  conclusion that " immigration 
had a signif icant adverse i mpact on the wages of  natives without a h igh school e d u cation " ) .  I n  
turn. t h e  media widely reponed the conclusions o f  this C I S  papcr. See. e.g . .  Joe Cantlupe.  
Gu!!st-•vorker Progmm Culled Misguid!"d. SAN D IEGO U N I ON-T R I B  . . J ulv 13. 2001. at Al6: 
Alfredo Corchado. Studi!"s Conflict on Benefits, Costs of Me.\icun Influx: Borli Sides Press.1· Issue 
Be/(!re Fo.r. Congress Dehotes. D A LLr\S MO RNIN G NEWS . Ju ly 13. 20lll . a t  l OA :  Je rry Kammer. 
Mexicun l11 1 1 1 1 igrants Sop Citi:en.\, Report Sun. A R IZ. REPUBLIC.  July 13.  2Dfll . at At>: P atr ick J .  
McDlll1n e l l .  Di111 Vie1v  of Mr:xico Migrution; Studv: Group Bocking Tight Li11 1 irs So1·s Influx 
LJrings Huge Co.11.1 Bur Fe1v Be!!e.fits. L.A.  T I :VI ES .  July J 3. 200 I. pt. 2. at I .  
02. See N RC supm note 0 0 .  at 22:-: (not ing that  " [b] y l l)LJ5. high school dropouts reprc­
scntcd kss than 1 0  percen t  of the American workforce 
. . and were "J decl i n ing group of 
Amc· r ican workers" ) .  
S:>. S a  BorJaS d a ! . . supm note 7LJ.  at 5 fi .  Thus. t h i s  approach "does no t  trulv est imate the 
actual impact of immigratioa on the !<Jbor market. 
.
. N RC .  supru note 60.  at  227.  
0-t. Se!" Friedberg & Hun t . supro note 7:'i.  a t  .iLJ. 
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Furth ermore , Borjas ,  Freeman, and Katz simulate what  would 
have happened if we had cut off all immigration and all increases in 
trade flows since 1 980:�' We cannot infer from their  study that 
immigration restrictions alone could have prevented the drop in  
wages that  they identify, because they do not attempt to simulate that 
counterfactual . Given that immigration and international trade are 
substitutes. a decrease in immigration would probably cause an 
increase in trade flows, which would have a similarly depressing effect 
on the wages of unskilled natives. This trade effect is a second reason 
that their results overstate the actual effect that immigration policies 
standing alone would have upon native wages. 
2.  Income D istribution and the Costs of Protectionism 
Even if present levels of immigration h ave litt le effect on native 
wages in  the United States, a more liberal immigration policy might 
produce more significant effects. Indeed, m uch of the support for 
current immigration restrictions is  protectionist in nature . Restric­
tionists often cite the need to protect U .S .  workers from immigrant 
competition in the labor market.x" 
Like trade barriers, however ,  immigration barriers sacrifice gains 
from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of  natives as a group.x7 In 
this sense , protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth from 
some natives to others. It is l ikely that we could redistribute this 
same wealth through tax policies and transfer programs rather than 
through protectionism and thereby make all  classes of nat ives better 
otl because l iberal ized immigration produces net gains for natives as 
a group . Thus, concern for the distribution of income among natives 
does not imply that restrictive immigration laws are in order.  
First, concerns regarding income inequality do not justify any re­
strictions on ski l led immigration, because skil led immigrants not only 
increase total wealth for natives but also promote a more equit able 
distribution of income among natives. They are l ikely to have an 
adverse effect only on compet ing ski l led natives and increase the real 
wages of everyone else. including less skilled natives, who enj oy the 
benefits of a greater supply of skil led labor.  Therefore , the pursuit of 
a more equal dis tribu t ion of income would at most j ustify concerns 
85. So: Borj as d a ! . _  Sllfll"ll llotc 7lj. a t  fi t .  
oo. s��. e.g. . George J .  B orjas. H EA VE:\S DOOR:  L V I � I J C RATIO'-J POLICY A i\ D  THE 
A\I ER IC-\N EC0'!0\1 y ( l ljl)l) ) 
87. See NRC. supm note 68. at l 35-5:1.  
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regarding unskilled immigration , which could have an adverse effec t  
on real wages of  unskil led native workers. 
Second, even with respect to unskilled immigration. the appro­
priate response to these distributive concerns is redistribution 
through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies ,  not immigra­
tion restrictions. If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from 
adverse distribut ive effects, redistribution is l ikely to be a less costly 
solution than protectionism. If so, then optimal policies would 
liberalize immigration insofar as it increases the total wealth of 
n atives. As long as immigration increases total wealth, then those 
who gain from immigration can compensate those who lose and st i l l  
be better off. That is, those who gain by paying lower wages,  or by 
buying products and services at lower cost ,  can afford to pay enough 
to compensate those who find their wages fall relative to prices. 
Through redistribution, we can attempt to shift the costs of liberal ized 
immigration to the beneficiaries of liberalization. 
This redistribution would produce some costly d istortions, but 
the deadweight loss of protectionism would presumably be greater 
than the deadweight loss from taxes with the same effect on the 
overall distribution of income . That is .  protect ionism is presump­
tively less efficient than the tax system in produci ng a desirable 
distribution of income, because protectionism not only produces the 
d istortions associated with redistribution, but also sacrifices the gains 
from immigration in the labor market .':-; For example, if the Im imgra-
:--::--: .  Louis  Kaplow and Steven Shavel l  suggest that  we can a l ways replace an econom i c a l ! \  
i n e ffici e n t  rule w i t h  a n  effic ient  ru l e  without m a king any income class worse o tl provided that  
we m a ke the a ppropriate adj ustme nts in  i ncome taxes.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavc l l .  
Wli r  rile Lcgul Svsrem is L ess Etficicnr rlwn rhc Income Tar i n  Rcdisrri/mring fn conzc. 2.' J .  
LEGAL STUD. 667. 66lJ ( 1 994) :  S teven Shavel l .  A Nore on Efficienc\· vs. Disrri/) { 1 /ionnl EiJ l l ii \  1 n  
L egal Rulenwking: Should D isrriburionol Equirv tVfuller Civm Oprimul fncun1e Tu.wiiun :) 7 1  
AJvl . ECON. REV.  PAPERS & P R OC. 4 1 4  ( 1 98 1 ) . They argue that  " using legal  rules  to redistr ib­
ute i ncome d istorts work incentives ful l y  as much as the i ncome tax system - beca use the 
distortion i s  caused by the redi s t r i but ion i tse lf- and also creates i ne fficiencies  in the act ivit ies 
regu l a ted by the legal  rules . · ·  K a p low & Shavel l .  sup m .  a t  667-68. Critics have objected to this  
- -double-distortion argument" by p o i n ting out that  legal  rules are not a lways l e ss costly than 
income taxes. See, e.g . . Chris vVi l l i a m  Sanchirico.  D econ.1 1mcring rhe Ne1v Efficiencr R({[imwle. 
86 CORNELL L REV.  1 003 . 1 008 (200 1 ) . [t  seems fair to conclude. however. that  the cloubk­
cl istortion argument sti l l  raises a presumption in favor o f  taxes rather than i ne ffici e n t  legal rules.  
subj ect  to a poss ib le  rebuttal  i n  any particular case a long the l ines suggested by these crit ics .  
The objections ra ise d  by these crit ics do not imply that  protectionism is  superior to red is tr i ­
bution through taxes.  Chris  Sanchirico.  for example.  notes  that  a double distortion mav be less  
cost ly  than a single distortion. beca use "" [cl ] istortions mav counteract one a n o t h e r . "  !d. at  l i i l 7 . 
There seems to be no reason to think. howeve r .  that  the d istortions associated with prokctiun-­
ism m itigate the d istortions in work i ncentives associated with redistribut ion.  S i m i l ar lv .  
Chr is t ine  lol ls  suggests that l e g a l  ru les  mav achieve redistribution w i t h  less d istort ion in 1vork 
i ncentives if individual  workers bear  the cost i mposed bv the legal rule with onlv low p robabi l i t\'  
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tion of unskilled workers reduces the wages of unskilled natives ,  then 
raising taxes on those workers with higher incomes and reducing 
taxes on native workers with the lowest incomes could leave all 
classes of natives better off than they would be in the absence of 
immigration.KY That is ,  those classes that would pay higher t axes to 
compensate unskilled native workers are l ikely to bear a s t i l l  h eavier 
burden under the protectionist alternative, which raises the prices of 
goods and services for all consumers. That is, protectionist policies 
currently impose an implicit t ax on these consumers that p robably  
costs them more than the explicit tax that  would be  necessary to  
compensate unskilled n ative workers for the  effects of  l iberalized 
immigration policies. Once we recognize that protectionism is mere ly 
a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it should be apparent that  there 
is no good reason to favor protectionism over less cost ly and more 
e fficient transfer policies. 
We could achieve redistribution more efficiently and e quitably 
by expanding programs already in use under the existing U .S .  tax 
system. We could make Socia l  Security taxes more progressive, for 
example ,  or we could increase the earned income tax credit and 
liberalize its e ligibility requirements .Y I I These progressive reforms can 
and are unduly optimistic . See Christine lo l ls. Belwvioru/ Economics Anoivsis of Redisrrihu1ive 
Legal Rules. 5 1  V AND. L REV. l o53 ( 1998) .  Insofar  as protectionism u l t imate ly  transfers 
wea l th  through the same channel as the income tax. by changing the worker·s a fter-tax income . 
.J o l t s ·  crit ique offers no defense for protectionism. Jol ts  also suggests that  if workers trea t  the 
cost of a legal  ru le  as an expenditure out of i ncome " ' rather than d i rect charges against i ncome:· 
th is  mental accounting may reduce distort ions in work incentives .  !d. a t  1 670. I nsofa r  as this 
claim is true about the costs of protect ionism. however. a t  most i t  would m i l i ta te i n  favor of  
taxes on l uxury goods as our redistributive policy. not  in favor or protect ionist po l ic ies  that  
needlessly sacrifice gains from immigration in  the l abor marke:t .  
Final ly .  Sanchirico a lso suggests tha t  individua l s  may be heterogeneous in  ways that  make  
legal ru le s  superior to taxes. Sanchiri co. supra. at  ! 057-o4: see Chr i s  Wi l l i am Sanchir ico. Taxes 
Versus Legal Rules us lnslrumenrs for Equiry: A t'vfure Equirahle View. 29 J .  L E G A L  STU D .  797 
(2000 ) .  This obj ection might s uggest a defe nse of  immigra t ion restrictions if such pol icies 
happened to change the incomes. for example. of those with the least e last ic supply of labor. 
There is no reason . however. to think tha t  protectionism targets i ts transfers in ways that reduce 
d istortions in work incentives. Nor is there any reason to be l ieve that protect ionism targe ts i ts  
transfers in  w::�ys especia l lv  appea l ing from the perspective ol equity .  See in fi·u note 9 l .  
S9. See Barry R .  Chiswick. Illegal fnunigrarion ami fmmigmriun Conrrol . .f . ECON. P E R S P  . .  
Summer 1 9SS. a t  1 0 1 . 107.  
90.  Thus.  I do not propose tha t  we ident ify workers displaced by immigrant  competit ion 
and target subsidies to those individuals  as we d ire:ct " "adj ustment assistance· · to those harmed 
by import competi t ion.  See RAJ B H A LA .  lNTER N ATIOi\f\ L T R A D E  LAW l 5S0-S9 (2d eel .  20U0) 
( d iscussing trade adjustment assistance programs) :  J O H l\  H. J A CKSON ET A L  .. LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTE RNATION A L  ECONOMIC R E LATIONS fill0-65 ( 3d  eel .  1 995 ) (same ) .  Trade 
adJ ustment programs have proven  ' ·nightmarish ly  complex· ·  and · · in.c ffectua t . · ·  B HA LA.  supm. 
a t  l5 1l2 .  Instead. the measures proposed here would only seek to ensure tha t  immigration 
l ibera l izat ion does not i ncrease after-tax income inequa l i tv .  
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supplement the income of unskilled native workers if unskilled 
immigration drives down their real wages. This alternative could 
reduce deadweight loss while sti l l  redistributing the same amount of 
wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism. 
Evidence that immigration has only mild effects upon the wages of 
unskilled natives suggests that modest changes in the tax system may 
be sufficient to offset the distributive effects of l iberalized U .S .  
immigration policies. 
These measures would not seek to compensate precisely every 
single individual affected adversely by liberalization so that immigra­
tion reform would make literally no one worse off. To insist that 
these reforms effect a Pareto improvement over the status quo is to 
set too high a hurdle for reform. Such a requirement would prevent 
us from implementing virtual ly any reform in any public policy. 
Not only is it infeasible as a practical matter to replicate exactly 
the redistribution produced by protectionism, it is also not desi rable 
as a normative matter that we do so. We can design progressive tax 
and transfer policies so that they redistribute income on the basis of 
morally relevant criteria,  whereas the alternative of protectionism 
distributes its subsidy on a morally arbitrary basis .  Protectionism 
subsidizes the unskilled native who happens to face immigrant 
competit ion in the labor market but not the similarly unskil led native 
who does not.  In this sense, protectionism is  inferior to tax and 
transfer policies from the perspective of not on ly economic e fficiency 
but also horizontal equity.9 1  
B. Fiscal Effects of Immigrmion 
The presence of transfer policies, however, may raise concerns 
about the e ffect of immigrants upon the public treasury. M uch of the 
debate over the effects of immigration upon the welfare of natives has 
focused on the possibility of negative fisca l  effects .92 Even if concerns 
about the fiscal costs of immigration were to justify restrictions on 
unskilled immigration, however, these concerns would not justi fy any 
restrictions on the immigration of skilled workers , who tend to have 
higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of 
public benefits. The empirical evidence confirms that educated 
l) l .  Thus .  prokcti onism de rives no just ificat ion from the fact that  the  transfe rs that  i t  
ach ieves do not fa l l  on precisely the  same i ndividuals as redistri butiYe transfers t h rough the tax 
sys tem.  Sr>e supra note 88.  
SJ2. Sc:e. e.g . .  CA!v !AROTA. supru note  8 l .  a t  35-41. 53-54: N RC. supra not.c 60.  at  254-362 .  
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immigrants will on average have a net positive effect on  n atives, 
taking into account their effects on the public treasury_Y3 It would be 
in  the economic in terests of US natives to admit ski l led workers 
without protectionist ' ' labor certification" requirements or quantita­
tive restrictions. The United States should eliminate or l iberalize 
these restrictions. 
L Fiscal Policies as Less Restrictive Alternatives to Exclusion 
Even for unskilled immigrants ,  the optimal response to fiscal 
concerns would not be exclusion, but less restrictive alternatives 
designed to e l iminate the fiscal burden that these immigrants impose 
on natives. That is, if some immigrants have a negative effect on the 
public sector, the optimal response is not quantitative or other 
protectionist restrictions on immigration. R ather, the appropriate 
response is fisca l .  Restrictions on alien access to public benefits, for 
example , can improve the fiscal impact of immigration without 
excluding unskil led immigrants fro m  the U.S. labor force. Exclusion 
is the more costly response for both natives and immigrants, because 
it excludes immigrants not only from our public benefits but also from 
our labor market and thereby sacrifices the gains from trade that they 
and we would otherwise enjoy. 
The obj ective of reducing the burden that immigrants impose on 
natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access 
93. The NRC. ror example.  found that the average i mmigrant wi th more than a high school 
education pays e nough in taxes to prod uce a net fiscal benefit. See N RC. supra note nS. at  33-1 
( Tab le 7.:'1 ) .  In fact .  once the N RC econom i s ts take the posit ive fiscal effect of the immigrant"s 
descendants into account.  they find that  the average immigrant with a high school e ducation 
produces a net surplus o f  $:'1 ! .000. and the average immigrant with more than a h igh school 
education produces a net smp lus of $ lYS.OOO. Sce it!. ( reporting net present value of average 
fiscal impacts i n  1 996 dol lars) .  Although these figures ··do not take into account  indi rect fiscal 
effects of immigra nts arising from any consequences of immi gration for the earnings or 
employment of the exist ing labor force . " ·  the N RC notes that l abor market effects on nat ive 
workers · ·are l i ke iv  to be qui te smal l  and . . . could even be posi t ive . ' '  !d. at  305. 
As long as the N R C  calculat ions . .  contain no feedbacks through the general economy." 
however. · · they do not re flect diminishing returns to immigrants as a resu l t  o f  their  h ypotheti­
Gd l y  increasing n umbers . " ·  /d. <:1!  333. An incrementa l  immigrant m ight drive down the wages 
of prior immigr<lnts .  for example .  which would reduce the taxes paid by those prior i m migrants. 
Taking this e ffec t  i n to account .  howe ver.  wou l d  not change our conclus ion that ski l led 
immigrants con fe r  a net economic benefi t  on natives. Any such reduction in  taxes pa id by 
immigrants \\ Ou ld  be outweighed bv the bendi t nat ives enjoy in the labor market  by reducing 
the cost of i m m igra nt  l abor. A wage reduction of one dol lar .  for examp l e .  would represent a 
gain to nat i\·es as employers or consumers.  and the resul t ing loss of tax revenues  would  offset 
onlv a fract ion of this gain .  [ f a drop in wages of one dolbr could reduce tax pavments by more 
than one c!o l lar .  then imm igrants would en joy a net benefit from wage re d uct ions and would 
!<ave a l rc: ach demancl c cl l ower wages in orde r to enjov this f iscal benefit .  
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of aliens to various entitlement programs. Current U .S .  l aws,  for 
example ,  generally exclude nonimmigrants, including temporary 
workers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public 
benefits :  with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for 
"any Federal public benefit. "94 Current law also includes restrictions 
on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent resi­
dents, to federal entitlement programs.95 
The National Research Council ("NRC') estimates that by 
excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits for their 
first five years in the U nited States, welfare legislation enacted in 
1 996 improves the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by 
$8,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.% Moreover .  if the new 
welfare law has the effects predicted by its proponents, then the 
positive net fiscal impact of immigration will increase st i l l  more : the 
new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid to individual 
immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low-income aliens 
and thereby raise the income of the average immigrant . 97 Thus, the 
NRCs estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration l ikely understate 
the fiscal benefits of future immigrants, given the legislation passed 
by Congress in 1 996. Therefore, liberalized immigration is now even 
more l ikely to produce net economic benefits for natives. 
If immigration liberalization is coupled with expanded redistribu­
tion of income, however. then i t  may be necessary to exclude immi­
grants from these increased transfers. Otherwise ,  transfers to 
immigrants could dissipate the economic gains to natives. ')/' Thus, 
unskilled immigrants may have a net posi tive effect on the welfare of 
nat ives only if we restrict their access to transfer programs. 
2. Nonimmigrants and Access to Citizenship 
Although immigrants can gain ful l  access to public benefi ts upon 
naturalization, only aliens "admitted for permanent residence
,. may 
naturalize as U .S .  citizens.9'J Aliens admi tted on nonimmigrant visas 
only, including temporary workers. are not admitted as permanent 
l) 4  1l U . S . C .  � l 6 l l ( a)  (: :'001 1 )  
l) 5  See it!. � §  1 6 1 2- 1 6 1 3 . 
lJ6. See N RC. supm note 61). at 33':.1. 
lJ7 .  Se� 1) U .S.  C. � l nO l  ( 2 ) ( B )  ( 21 H II I )  ( s t d t i ng the ubjcct i\'c u l  e nsuring th:H . . the :Jv:I i l cl i.• i ! I t\· 
of public benefits not constitute a n  inccnt i\·c for imm i gration t o  the· U n i te J  Swtc:; .. ) . 
':!o. See Chang. sup u1 note 67. a t l 2 l l l . 
':!':!. S US.C. § 1 427( a ) ( 2000) 
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residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements and 
not eligible to naturalize. 100 Therefore , even if fiscal concerns j ustify 
restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskilled workers, 
these concerns cannot j ustify restrictions on their access to nonimmi­
grant visas. A truly temporary worker,  for example, would remain in 
the United States only while employed and would then return home, 
imposing even less  of a burden on the public treasury than a perma­
nent resident . 10 1 The empirical evidence indicates that immigrants are 
l ikely to mak e  a positive contribution to the public treasury t hrough 
the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden 
only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and 
gain access to public benefits . 1m Thus, temporary workers admitted 
on nonimmigrant visas , even if unskilled , are likely to have a net 
positive economic impact on natives, and there is little reason to 
restrict their  entry. 
Under current U.S .  l aw,  unskilled workers may enter temporarily 
on H-2A visas for agricultural workers or on H-2B visas for other 
workers , 1113 but both visas are subj ect to labor certification require­
ments and other protectionist restrictions. 10� For example ,  H-2B visas 
are limited to 66,000 per year, 1115 and require workers to come " tem­
porarily to the United States to perform . . .  temporary service or 
labor. " ton This "double requirement of ' temporariness"' requires the 
H-2B alien not only to enter temporarily but also to fill a temporary 
job . 1 1 '7 The liberalization or el imination of these requirements could 
greatly increase use of these programs. 1 11� As long as we retain the 
requirement of employer sponsorship,  we can ensure that these guest 
1 00. See LEG OiviSKY.  supru note 12 .  a t  99 ( d ist inguishing i m migrants from non i m m igrants ) .  
I 0 1 .  See A l a n  0. Sykes. The We/f{u·e Economics of Jmmigrarion Law: A Tlzeorelical Surve\' 
1vi!lz 1111 Anulvsis of U S. PuliC\'. in J us·ncE IN  I M M I G RATION.  supm note 4 1 . at 1 58.  1 89. 
102. See N RC. supra note oR. a t 3 15 ( Figure 7 .9) .  
103.  See S U S. C .  � l l 0 1( a ) ( I 5 )( H ) ( i i )  (2000) .  
104. See id. � 1 188( a ) ( l ) : R C.F. R .  � 2 14.2 ( h ) ( 6 ) ( i v )  ( 20() 1 ) .  
1 05. See S US.C. § 1 1 84(g)( 1 ) ( B ) (2CJ00 ) .  
lllo. M � I I 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 5 ) (H ) ( i i ) ( b ) .  
107.  THO!viAS ALEXA N D E R  ALEINI KOFF E T  Al. . . i :VIi\.I IG RATION A N D  CITI ZENSHIP: 
PROCE�S -'. 1\ D  POLICY 3LJ5 (4th e el .  1 998 ) .  
l OS . Adm issi ons under H-28 visas  h a \·e rem a i n e d  be low one-third o f  t h e  quota l i m i t  i n  
rece n t  years.  and a d m i ssions under H-2 A  visas have been s i m i l a r .  See id. a t  393:  see also id. a t  
395 ( noting that  the clcmand for H-2 8 visas  - -would be much h igher but for t h e  double 
· t emporariness· requirement " " ) :  Sykes.  supru note L U I . a t  1 �9 ( noting that " " beca use o f  the 
t mnsaction costs of  obtaining a visa coupkd with  the l i m i te d  certi fications for labor shortages in 
the agricultural  ,;ector. e m ployers often find that  [ H-2A j v isas a rc not worth the e ffort to 
proc ure .. ) . 
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workers will  b e  gainfully employed and likely t o  confer a n e t  eco­
nomic benefit on natives . 1 uY 
The alternative to a liberalized guest-worker program for many 
migrant workers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant .  I n  
fact , employment-based immigration o f  unskilled workers into the 
United States has largely taken the form of i l legal rather than legal 
immigration. 1 1 u Given that unauthorized immigrants have litt le access 
to public entitlements for as long as their presence remains unauthor­
ized, they may make a positive contribution to public coffers under 
the fiscal policies currently appl ied to them. Without dist inguishing 
between legal and illegal immigrants, the NRC found that once we 
take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant ' s  descendants i nto 
account, an immigrant with less than a high school education imposes 
a net fiscal cost of only $13 ,000 in net present value in  1 996 dollars . 1 1 1 
I f  the 1 996 welfare legislation excludes immigrants from seven 
specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the 
United S tates, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant 
would improve by $8,000. 1 1 2 These NRC figures suggest that if an 
immigrant never has access to such benefits ,  as would be the case for 
an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status, then such 
an immigrant would probably have a positive fiscal impact even i f  the 
immigrant were unski l led .  
If  unauthorized immigrants produce benefi ts for natives through 
not only the labor market but also the public sector, then n atives h ave 
little to gain by imposing sanctions on those who employ unauthor­
ized immigrants. The repeal of these sanctions would promote the 
interests of both natives and unauthorized immigrants. Indeed . not 
only has President B ush recently called for repeal , 1 1 � but so has 
organized labor. in a dramatic reversal of i ts support for employer 
sanctions since lobbying for their enactment in 1 986 . 1 1 4 
Instead, legalization of unauthorized immigrants through a liber­
alized guest-worker program would serve the interests of  these 
l i lY. S e e  Chang. supru note o7. a t  l l :-> l -1'3.  
l \ 0. See id. a t l lY7.  
l l l . See N RC. supru note 6:->. a t  334.  
1 1 2. See id. at 33Y.  
1 1 3. Sec Bi l l  Sammon. Buslz Urges Lcguli::ing A liens. \VAS I-l . T l \ I ES .  Sept .  7 .  20l l l. a t  A I .  
I l -L See Nancy Cleebnd. 1\ FL - C/O Culls /(n A n u z e.1 1v  lor Illegal U S. Work<:'rs. L.A.  Tii\tES.  
Feb. 1 7 . 2000. a t  A l .  Labor l eaders c i ted the need to protect una uthorized immigrants  from 
exploi ta t ion lw employers .  See id. : Stev<en Ci rcen huuse. Luhor Urgn A nznest\' Jo r !llegul 
ln z m igmnl.l . N . Y .  T I \I ES.  Feb. ! 7 .  2000. at ;-\26.  
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immigrants as well as the interests of natives. The workers would 
gain from having a legal a l ternative to i l legal entry and l ife as an 
unauthorized immigrant,  which leaves them vulnerable to deportation 
by the government and abuse by employers . Furthermore, admission 
as a guest worker need not entai l  permanent status as an alien. NRC 
estimates indicate that the  U nited States could allow even  an un­
ski l led immigrant to naturalize without generating a net fiscal burden 
i f  a sufficient period of alienage without access to public benefits  has 
passed.  In  fact ,  as the B ush administration considers proposals to 
liberal ize our immigration policies, it is currently discussing an 
expanded guest-worker program that  would eventually al low aliens to 
adj ust their status to permanent residence and ultimately n aturalize 
as citizens. 1 1 5 
C. Intolerance 
So how can we justify our current restrictions on the e ntry of 
immigrant workers? 1t is d ifficult to see a principled j ustification for 
imposing quotas or labor certification requirements upon their 
immigra tion. These protectionist barriers do not serve the economic 
interests of natives as a group. 
Perh aps immigration barriers are a second-best response to the 
concerns of natives when the first-best response is politically infeas i­
ble . 1 1 " In this appeal to realism, as Goodin notes ,  "real ism serves as 
an excuse rather than as a justification," and ' 'appealing to that 
excuse i mposes a further  obligation ,  namely, to make very certain 
that the constraints on doing better really are immutable . ' ' 1 1 7 If they 
are n o t ,  then our duty is to seek to change those constraints so that 
what  was previously considered politically infeasible becomes possi­
ble. ' ·Focusing too tightly on second- and third-best options makes us 
not look closely enough to see whether and how the first-best option 
might actually be pursued.  " 1 1 � 
Tbe q uestion then becomes: why is the first-best policy less popu­
l a r  t h a n  the more costly policy of immigration restrict ion? Why are 
I ! :i. ·''cc i\-L1 rcus Stc:rn. New lmmigrurion Plan Ruises Ne"· lssun: U S. - fl1exicau Srmreg_1· 
( ;o •:s 8c \"l ' l l ' l  i \ n :ne.ln·. Guest - H'urk<'r Pmgm m .  SA:--1 DIEGO UNION-TRIG . . Aug. 1 2 . 21 10 1 .  at 
,'-'. ! .  
i ! !1 .  \'.'c.>och\ a rcl m:.1kcs th is  type of c l a i m .  Si!e Woodward. su;1m note 40. a t  1-10 ( " Rcstr ic­
c �<' J !b <' !". <: n J n .  in  m v  mgu m c n t .  have the sta tus of nun-ide a l .  second-best  s o l u t ions . . .  1 n  a n  
i 1 7 . G uu d : n .  suem nute  50. a t 2-IY. 
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w e  s o  quick to blame immigrat ion for our problems and eager t o  seize 
upon immigration restriction as the appropriate response? For 
example, why do advocates for unskilled n ative workers lobby 
successfully for immigration restrictions rather than for more redistri­
bution through the tax system? If opposition to redistribution makes 
expanded transfers politically infeasible, then why is this opposition 
any less vocal or any less effective against immigration restrictions 
that achieve the same redistribution at higher cost? Immigration 
restrictions, after alL do a worse j ob of serving the interests of natives 
than more efficient transfer policies . 1 1 9 
We can find at least part of the explanation for the popularity of 
immigration restrictions in the preferences of n atives regarding the 
ethnic or racia l  composition of the U .S .  population and thus its labor 
force . Almost since their inception, federal immigration restrictions 
have reflected concerns regarding the race and ethnicity of immi­
grants . 1 21 1  Soon after Congress began to regulate immigration in 
1 87 5 , 1 2 1  i t  enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act , 1 22 only the first in  a 
series of laws restricting the immigration of Chinese laborers. 1 23 
Subsequent laws reflected anxiety regarding not on ly Asian immigra­
tion but also immigration from eastern and southern E urope .  In  
1921, Congress enacted the  first quantitative restrictions on immigra­
tion,  creating a national origins q uota system that skewed the al loca­
tion of visas toward al iens from northern and western Europe. 1 2� 
Given this history of racism and xenophobia . i t  would be naive to 
assume that intolerance does not continue to provide polit ical support 
for imm igration restrictions in general .  Indeed.  restrictionist authors 
like Peter Brimelow are quite explicit in  their expressions of alarm 
regarding the racial complexion of the immigrant stream into the 
United States . 1 2' The U.S .  Supreme Court recognized the pervasive 
influence of xenophobia in the formulation of our public policies in 
1 1 0. Sa supra note :-\1-l. 
1 20. See U.S.  CO!\!M .N ON C I V I L  R I G HTS. THE T A R N I S H E D  GOLDEN DOOR: C I V I L  R I G HTS 
ISSUES IN l i\ l ivl ! G RATION 7- 1 2  ( 1 080) (reviewing t h e  h i story of discriminat ion in U . S .  mm1 1gra­
tion policies) .  
1 2 1 . Se.: Act of  Mar.  3 .  1:-\75.  ch.  i 4 l .  I S  Stat .  477. 
1 2 2 .  Act  o f  iV!av 6.  1 882. c h .  1 26.  22 Stat .  5 8  ( repe a l e d  J l)43 ) .  
1 23. See. e.g . . Act o f  May 5 .  1 :-\02.  ch.  60. 27 S t a t .  25: Act o f  Oct .  1 .  1 :-\:-\K. ch . 1 064. 25 Stat .  
5 1 14: Act of  July  5 .  l KK-L  c h .  220.  23 S t a t .  1 1 5 .  
1 24 .  A c t  of  M a y  1 0 . 1 92 1 .  c h .  K.  s 2 (a ) .  4 2  S t a t .  5 .  Congress modif ied t h i s wstem i n  the 
I mmigra t i o n  Act o f  l Y24. ch .  1 00. � l l ( a ) .  43 Stat.  153.  1 5 Y  ( repealcd l l)(i) ) .  
1 25 .  Src PETER B R I \ I E LOW. ALIEN Ni\TION: C O � I \- ION S EN S E  AROL'T A �I E R I C.-\ . :) 
h 1 � 1 1 G RATION DISASTER ) :-\-73 ( 1 0LJ5 ) ( descr i b i n g  \vh i t e  A me rica as caught  b e t w e e n  the 
· ·p i ncers .
. 
of  H i spanic  a n d  Asian imm igr,l t i o n  ) .  
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Graham v. Richardson , when the Court declared that "classifications 
based on alienage, l ike those based on . . .  race, are inherently sus­
pect . "  t en 
D oes this explanation for the popularity of immigration restric­
tions provide a justification? We might seek to interpret the " in ter­
ests" of natives broadly to include the satisfaction of their prefere nces 
regarding the ethnic or racia l  composition of the U .S .  population. 1 27 I t  
i s  tel ling, however, that we normally reject intolerant preferences as 
j ustifications for employment discrimination . 1 2� A reliance on  prefer­
ences for the ethnic status quo to justify our immigration l aws would 
underscore the second sense in which our immigration laws violate 
our l iberal antidiscrimination principles. 
Restrictionists might respond that the ir preference is neither rac­
ist nor xenophobic, but simply a preference for associating with 
workers most l ike themselves .  Perhaps the restrictionist simply 
prefers to be surrounded by workers who share the same culture and 
the same values and fears becoming surrounded by those who seem 
foreign and unfamiliar. But can we distinguish this associational 
preference from intolerance - the desire not to encounter those who 
are different? Would the desire of an  employer or its employees  to 
maintain a white workplace, because they prefer  its homogeneous 
culture or simply value the familiar status quo, justify the exclusion of 
racial minorities ?  
1 26 .  �03 U . S .  365. 372 ( l LJ7 1 ) . The a u thor o f  the Crnlwm opinion would l a t e r  expla in  t h a t  
· · a l i e n s  often h a ve b e e n  the vict ims of i rrat ional  d iscr imi n a t i on " '  a n d  . .  h istorical ly have been 
disabled by t h e  pre j udice of  tho:: m a jority .
.
. which l e d  .. the Court to  conclude that  a l i e nage 
c lass i fi ca t ions ' in themse lves supplv a re ason t o  i n fe r  a n t i p a t h y ·  . . .  and t h e r e fore d e m a n d  close 
j ud i c i a l  scrutiny. · ·  Toll  v.  i'vloreno.  45S U.S. I .  :20-2 1 ( B iackmun. J . . concurring) (quot ing 
Personnel  Adm · r  v .  Feeney.  �42 U .S .  256. 272 ( J l)79)  ) .  The Cru!uun Court struck down state 
l aws cond it ioning access to we l fare benefits  on e i th e r  U.S.  cit izenship or  residence in the U n i te d  
S t a t e s  f o r  a speci fied n u m b e r  of  y e a r s .  Recognizing t h e  t e n s i o n  between t h e  Cruhwn reasoning 
and federal  immigration restr ict ions.  however.  t h e  Court would later re fuse to apply the s a m e  
scrut i n y  to fed e r a l  laws d i scri m i n at i n g  a g a i n s t  a l ie n s .  S e e  M a thews v.  D i �1Z .  426 U . S .  67.  1) l-S7 
( ! LJ76) .  
1 27 .  Sfe Chang. supm note 67. a t  1 2 10-2 1 .  W e  m i ght count the sat isfact ion of  t hese racist  or  
xenophobic preferences a n  e k mc: n t  Df  the we l fa re o f  t he se n a t ives.  I f  o u r  objc:ct ives  i nc lude t h e  
regulati on of  t h e:  r a c i a l  comp l e x i o n  of t h e  l abor force . then i m m igra t i o n  restrictions se rve that  
object ive well  by exc lud i ng most people of color i n  the world from access t o  our l abor market .  
I f  the exclus ion of  forcignc: rs i s  i ts e l f  our object ive.  then a pol icy of cxclusion y i e lds  a p e rfect fi t 
with that  object ive.  From t h i s  perspect ive.  i m m i g r a t i o n  restrict ion would be a fi rst-best  policy. 
not m e re l y  a second-best po l i cy . 
1 21). See D W O R K I' \ .  sup m note 2 1 .  �1t  2.04-3S ( a rguing t h a t  a calculat ion of s oc i a l  w e l fa re 
should excl ude intole rant prt:! crenccs i f  it is t o  j us t i fy a publ ic  pol icy ) :  Howard F. Chang.  ;\ 
L.iheml Thenrv of Sociu/ 1-\ 'e!fiu·e: Fuimcss. Uri/in·. und rile Purc!<J f'rincij >le. 1 1 0 Y.-\ LE L.J .  1 73 .  
l 7LJ-96 (2001 1 )  ( same ) .  
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If we would rej ect such associational preferences as a reason to 
exclude minorities from a single workplace, then why should we 
accept them as a reason to exclude people from all the workplaces in  
the  entire country, where the  claim of  an impact on one ' s  personal 
associational interests seems far more remote and tenuous? Even if 
we identify legitimate associational interests that do not derive from 
intolerance, i t  seems difficult to explain why we must protect these 
interests through employment discrimination mandated by the 
government on a national scale rather than through the less restrictive 
alternative of voluntary employment discrimination. If we consider 
these associational preferences to be legitimate, then why not s imply 
al low employers to discriminate on the basis of national origin rather 
than mandating such discrimination by law? 
Indeed,  our liberal ideals impose principles of neutrality on the 
state that  do not apply to the individual. Under this political theory, a 
l iberal state cannot j ustify discriminatory laws by endorsing one 
particular conception of the good, for example,  by favoring one 
particular religion, whereas individuals are left free to pursue their 
own conceptions of the good using their own private resources . 1 2Y 
Thus, even if we consider individuals free to discriminate within some 
private sphere based on ethnicity or cultural traits, these preferences 
cannot provide a justification within our liberal framework for 
discrimination imposed by the coercive powers of the state. 13 1 1 
1 29. See ACKERMAN.  supru note 30.  at l l  ( suggest ing that in  a l iberal state . no one can 
just ify a legal regime by c la iming that · ·his conception of  the good is better than that asserted by 
anY of  his fe l low ci t izens 
.
. ) :  RAWLS. supm note 10 .  at 448 (suggesting that in "a wel l -ordered 
suciety . . . .  the plans o l  l i fe of i nd iv idua l :;  a re d i fferent in the sense that these plans give 
prominence to d i ffe rent a ims. and persons arc l e ft free to determine the i r  good .
. 
) . 
1 30. See Carens. supru note: 22.  at 268 ( . . When the state acts it must trea t  individuals 
equal ly .
. .  
) .  Ackerman suggests that  the only legit imate reason for a l iberal state to restrict 
immigration is to protect the l iberal state itse l f. See ACKERMAN. supra note 38. a t  95 ("The 
only reason for restricting i mmigration i s  to protect the ongoing process of  l iberal conversation 
i tself .  
. .  
) .  S imi larly .  Perry notes that the admission of  "a large number o f  persons from groups 
espousing i l l ibera l  o r  undemocratic principles . . .  m ight .  if admitted on a suffic ient ly l arge scale. 
pose a real risk to the existence or character ol a l iberal democracy .
.. Perry. supra note 4 1 .  at 
1 1 4. This observat ion.  however. fai l s  to j ust i fy the restrictions we current ly i mpose on 
immigrat ion .  St'e id .  ( . . [ I j t  would presumablY take a manyfold increase in  the levels of 
immigrat ion to . . . the United Sta tt: s o r  Canada be fore such a risk could be regarded as a nything 
more than a theoretical possib i l i tY . .
. 
) .  Furthermore . we reduce th is  r isk if we admi t  a l iens as 
guest-workers wi th restricted access to cit izenship rather than as permanent residents who w i l l  
u l t imately natural ize and  vote.  Wi l l  Kvml icka .  on  t he  other hand .  argues t ha t  .. some l im i ts on 
immigra t ion can be j ustified  if we recognize that l iberal states exist. not only to protect standard 
rights and opportun it ies o f  incl iv iducl ls .  hut a lso to protect people ' s  cultural membership . "  WILL 
KY: I!U CKA.  MULTICULTl R A L  CiTIZENS \  l i P  1 25 ( l '195 ) .  For i nsightful cr it iques of the cul tural 
Z1rgumcnt  for the exclusion of a i lens .  sec J [A i' !-lr\ " l i'TON.  POLITICAL PH I LOSOPHY 230-46 
( 1 997 ) :  Pcrrv . .  \1/finl nutc 4 1 .  at  1 1 1 1-2 1 .  
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Instead, we are reluctant to satisfy these preferences explicitly 
through regulation by the state. Indeed , in 1965 we abolished the 
infamous national origins quota system because we recognized the 
i l legi timacy of preferences for particular ethnic groups . 1 3 1  How then 
can the preservation of the ethnic or cultural status quo be  any more 
acceptable as a reason for us to restrict immigration generally? 
Unless we consider the ethnic purity of our labor force to be  a p ubl ic 
good,  i t  is h ard to rationalize the employment discriminat ion man­
dated by our immigration restrictions as serving the nat ional  interest .  
Thus,  this employment discrimination against al iens,  l ike the forms of 
discrimination traditionally considered invidious, not only denies the 
v ictims of discrimination e qual  concern but is also difficult to j ustify 
as an ideal practice unless we appeal to i l l iberal prefe rences.  To the 
extent that these intolerant preferences help explain the enduring 
popularity of immigration restrictions despite the costs of these 
policies, this explanation underscores the il l iberal nature of the 
discrimination produced by these restrictions. 
Intolerant preferences, however i llegitimate ,  can impose real 
constraints on the feasibility of l iberalized immigration policies,  j ust 
as the general self-interest of  natives may impose such constraints .  
Nevertheless, we might p lausibly view these preferences as  more 
amenable to reform than the tendency of natives to pursue their own 
self- interest .  The evolution of attitudes in  the United States toward 
ethnic groups once greeted with hosti l ity offers hope that more 
tolerant attitudes will eventually prevail with respect to those who 
currently dominate the immigrant flow. Perhaps the process of 
immigration itself will promote acceptance of these newer waves of 
immigrants, much as integration u ltimately brought more e nlightened 
attitudes regarding Irish, Ital ian, and Jewish immigrat ion .  Indeed,  
spurred in part  by the increasing political influence of the Hispanic 
immigrant population in  the U nited States, current d iscussions of 
immigration reform have raised hopes for more open policies in  the 
near future, further underscoring the feasibility of l iberalization. 1 32 
1 3 1 . See U . S .  COiVI i'. t 'N ON C i V I L  R I GHTS. supm note 1 20. at l l  ( 'The nat ional  origins 
immigrn tion quota system generated opposition from the time of  i ts incept ion .  condemned for 
its artcmpts to mainta in the  exist ing racial composit ion of t he  United States . " ) .  
1 32. See Mark Benjamin .  Purries in Comperirion j(H f-fispunic Vore. U P ! .  Ju ly  2.:1. 200 1 .  
, r m i/uhfe ur LEXIS.  News Library. U P !  File:  Thomas B .  Edsall . Amnest\' Proposul Is Huge 
G!lln !J f, · j(,r f3ush: Presidenr Could he Rl! l l 'i!rtled Wirh 1-fispunic Vole hur Risks Angering G O P 's 
Cnn,crmrin- \·Ving. WASH.  POST. Julv 1 7. 20(l l .  a t  ;-\2 :  Eric Schmi t t .  Opm Door. Open 
QtH' ·, rin!!s: Flii.1 Wm· Up. N . Y .  T I \ I E S .  J uly 2 2 .  201l l .  � .:1. at l .  
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There may be other factors contributing to the popularity of im­
migration restrictions and standing in the way of reform. For exam­
ple, part of the problem may simply be the failure of the public to 
understand the costs of protectionism, which imposes an implicit tax 
on n atives hidden as increases in the prices of goods and services. 
This failure to appreciate the economic effects of misguided pol icies, 
however, does not offer a justification for such policies .  If  these 
popular misconceptions were immutable, it could also impose con­
straints on the feasibi l ity of liberalized immigration policies ,  j ust as 
the general self-interest of natives may restrict the set of polit ically 
feasible immigration policies. It seems plausible, however, to assume 
that these misconceptions are more amenable to change through 
education than the constraints imposed by the self- interest of natives. 
I t  is especially the role of scholars and educators not to take popular 
myths as given but instead to seek to promote a more enl ightened 
understanding of the effects of public policies. 
Ill .  POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND S ECON D-BEST PO L I C I ES 
So what are we to make of the foregoing analysis? What are the 
normative implications for immigration policy? Cosmopolitan l iberal 
ideals generally condemn d iscrimination against aliens. Even theories 
that allow us to privilege the interests of natives over those of aliens 
cannot justify employment di scrimination against aliens as ideal 
policy , ' '' unless we count the satisfaction of i l l iberal preferences as a 
reason to adopt immigration restrictions. 
E xcluding the satisfaction of segregationist preferences from our 
notion of social welfare , the welfare of  natives would at most j ustify 
discrimination against unskilled alien workers in fiscal pol icies, such 
as restricted access to public benefits, and in terms of access to 
citizenship. There is little j ustification for employment discrimination 
against aliens, given the alternative of redistribution among nat ives 
through taxes and transfer programs. From the narrow perspective of 
the economic interests of n atives ,  temporary worker visas may be an 
optimal response to fiscal concerns regarding alien access to public 
benefits. Through guest-worker programs, n atives enjoy the benefi ts 
1 33 .  Thus. President B ush ckfends suggestions for immigrat ion rdurm \\· i th " locus nn a 
l i beral ized l abor mad;e t .  stat ing :  · · [W jhcn we find wi l l ing employer and \\ i l i ing c:mp!ovc;e .  we 
ought to match the two. \Ve ought to make i t  eas ier for people who want to employ somebml\·. 
who are looking for workers. to be able to hire people who want to work. ' "  Edv, in Chen 0� 
Jonathan Pe te rson . Bush Hillfs ar Broader A mnt'str. LA. TI\ IES.  J uh· 2 7 .  2 1 H l l .  at A I .  
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of unskilled alien workers i n  the labor market but d o  not bear the 
fiscal burden of providing the ful l  set of public benefits that  these 
workers would enj oy if they were to gain access to permanent resi­
dence and ultimately citizenship.  
From the perspective of the interests of al iens, or from the per­
spective of cosmopolitan l iberal principles of social justice , h owever,  
these guest-worker programs are only second-best policies .  From 
these perspectives, the ideal policy may be legal permanent residence . 
access to citizenship, and access to all  public benefits .  The 
self- interest of natives, however ,  i s  bound to impose constraints of 
political feasibility on the availabi lity of immigrant visas. The empiri­
cal evidence suggests that unskilled al ien workers are l ikely to have a 
net  negative fiscal impact i f  granted ready access to permanent 
residence and ultimately citizenship. As long as natives are l imited in 
their willingness to bear these fiscal burdens, they are l ikely to restrict 
alien access to permanent residence, ei ther through quantitative 
restrictions or through qualitative restrictions that establish demand­
ing criteria for e ligibility. 1 3� These constraints are like ly to exclude 
many unskilled aliens from the U . S .  labor market unless they either 
are willing to immigrate il legally or have access to guest-worker visas.  
1 34. See Ronald B rownstein.  Residen cy or Core of !mnz igrunr Dt'hure: Po!icv: Distmre is 
Likely to Focus 011 rhe Numher of Unducunzenred Wurkl'rs in U.S. A /h! lved to Sel'k Pennwn:nr 
Stoflls. L.A. TIMES. July 29. 20ll l .  at A I .  Con,•2rvative Republica ns like Senator P h i l  G ramm 
adamantly oppose any access to permanent res i d .c ncc for guest workers.  GrGmm h a s  sa id  that 
any such program woul d  h ave to pass "over my cold.  dead pol i t ica l  body. "  M i c h e l l e  M i tte ls tadt .  
Senarurs Cull for Giving Residencr ro !mnzigrrtnrs: Bush Weighs Leguli;.urion !rleu Pus/zed h\' 
Fox. DALLAS MORNING NEWS. Ju ly 19.  200 1 .  a t  l A. Some observers have de scribed guest­
worker programs as  "more pol i t ical ly  v i a b l e "  without access to permanent residence . Jonathan 
Peterson. Alll l lf:stv 's the Road Bump i 1 1  Dehull:' on f1 1 1 1 1 1 igrution. LA. TIMES.  A Ltg. lJ. 201 1 1 . a t  
A 1 .  T h e  B u s h  a d m inistrat ion has s h i fted i t s  energies toward a program for temporary workers.  
which i t  rega rds as " more acceptable pol i t ica l l y  .
. . J onath:ll1 Pete rson . !nzmigmrion Emphasis on 
Guest Visus. L.A. Tli'.-!ES. Aug. l K . 200 1 .  at A I .  
I n  a recent G a l l up polL 67 % of respondents rejected eas i<Or  access to U . S .  c i t izenship 
for una uthorized immigran ts. whi le  only  2 K %  supported this proposaL See S te v e  S a i k r. 
A nalysis: Why Bush 13/wu/ered on f111111igmnrs. UP!.  Sept.  1 0. 200 1 . umi!uh!e ut L E X I S .  News 
Library,  UPI File .  Recognizing the pol i t i c a l  controve rsy generated by proposals  to g r a n t  access 
to c i tizenship. M e x i co has a lso emphasized an expanded guest-worke r  program in i ts negotia­
t ions with the Bush admi nistration and has been careful J1l)l to press the issue of  c i t izenship .  Bv 
ma intaining llexibi l i ty on this issue.  M e xico seeks.  as the M e x ican fore ign minister Jorge 
Castaneda puts i t. "as many rights as  possib le .  for as many i'vlexicans (in the U ni tt: d  States)  as 
possi b l e .  as soon as possible "  within the constraints of pol i t ical  fe asibi l i ty .  Robert  C o l l i e r. 
A1onzenrwn Gn!\vs to L egoli::e iv!igmnrs: Col/ups!' of Crinzptwlli.l e Dr'ctl on Bill A dds Pressure nn 
Bush. Congress. Mexico 's Fox. S.F .  CHRO'J . . J u l y  16.  201 J I .  at A l .  As one Mexican negotiator 
explained.  ' ·we . . .  have to be very rea l is t ic  .
.
. A l fredo Corchado. Feu Pushes _!(n u !\-lure Ofl('ll 
Bonier; Call for Freer Migmrion Srops Shorr of l?ec;uesr _!(1r Anznesry. D A LLAS MORI\ ING N EWS. 
J u l y  1 6 . 2001 . a t  l A .  Castaneda has explained that  access to c i tizenship " i s  not som e t h i ng of 
h uge sign i fica nce to us ."  Sergio M unoz. Jorge Custunedu: iv!c.ricu 's Man Ahmurl. LA. T i :-. I E S .  
A ug. 1 2 . 200 1 .  at  M 3 .  
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Given such political constraints on access to permanent resi­
dence, guest-worker programs may represent the only alternative to 
illegal immigration for al iens otherwise excluded from the U .S .  labor 
market . 1 35 Thus, such programs promote the welfare of not  only 
n atives but also aliens . compared to the politically feasible al terna­
tives; we should liberalize access to these programs by liberal izing or 
eliminating labor certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions 
on the duration of guest workers' employment or on their stays in the 
United States. We should also remove restrictions on the types of 
employment that these guest workers may take, so that aliens are free 
to seek any job in  the United States,  and all  sectors of the U .S .  
economy can benefit from h iring them. Current discussions of  an  
expanded guest-worker program envision liberalization beyond the 
agricultural sector ,1'" which would represent at least a step in  the right 
direction.  
The protection of the interests of  natives does not require many 
of the restrictions currently imposed on guest workers . 1 37 There is no 
need, for example ,  to restrict the al ien's freedom to move from one 
employer to another or from one sector of the economy to another. 
Like immigration restrict ions . restrictions on mobility between j obs 
are economically inefficient as well as unduly bur densome for the 
worker subj ect to the restriction. Freedom to leave an employer and 
to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to 
assert their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses .  without 
destroying the gains from trade that natives enjoy from employing 
alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats in Congress have 
urged that a reformed guest-worker policy include the freedom to 
change employersY" A proposal including at least this reform 
appears likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations between the 
United States and MexicoY9 vVe can also fortify the guest worker 's  
incen tives to complain about abuses with protections against em-
1 35. See J U L I A N  L .  S liv ! O N . T H E  ECO:\ Oiv! I C  CONSEQU E N CES OF l iVI M I G RATION 302-ll3. 3 10 
( l lJSlJ) ( a rguing that  a guesHvorker program is bet ter than a pol icy of exclusion ) :  Chang. supm 
note o7. at  l l lJ2-lJ4 (same: ) :  see u/.1o Seidman . . lllpm note 57. at l 43 ( . . Why should anyone 
bel ieve that a guest worker is ·explo i te e\ '  when he receives h igher wages and more protection i n  
t h e  program t h an  he would recc i \ c i f  he remained i n  h i s  home country ' ' ' " ) .  
l 3o. Sec D iane Lindquist . Guesr- cwrker Pion Oilers .!ohs Bnond Furms. SA N D I EG O  
U N I ON-T R I B  . . Aug .  1 0. 20U l .  at A2h. 
1 37 .  Democrats i n  Congress have stressed that guest workers should enjov the same r ights  
i n  the workplace as ci t izens .  Si:'e Peterson . . wpm note 3 .  at  A l .  
1 38. Sl:'e Corchaclo. supm note 2 .  a t  l A: Thompson. supm note 3 .  at  A2.  
1 39. Si:'e Stern . . wpm note 1 1 5 . a t  A l .  
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ployer retal iation for whistleblowers, or even bounties or other 
rewards for those who make meritorious claims that their employers 
are violating the rights of employees. 1�0 
At the same time, we must reduce or el iminate the protectionist 
barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship,  such as 
labor certification. These liberalizing reforms are especially essential 
if we make the employee's visa more portable .  E mployers wil l  be 
reluctant to invest much time or money in sponsoring a worker's visa 
if the worker is then free to leave to work for a competing employer 
who can thereby take a free  ride on the sponsoring employer's 
investment in the visa .  
We might also allow unskilled guest workers to adj ust their status 
to permanent residence without imposing a net burden on n atives if 
appropriate conditions are met .  Mexico has urged the  United S tates 
to al low guest workers to remain permanently, and a proposal includ­
ing some sort of access to permanent residence may yet emerge from 
negotiations between the two countries . 1 � 1  The conditions for adj ust­
ment of status might include,  for example ,  a sufficiently lengthy 
period of residence and employment as a guest worker without a 
criminal record, as well  as paymen t  of a sufficient amount in taxes 
over this period . 1 �2 
In any event, a guest-worker  program would not  produce a he­
reditary class of alien residents in the United States because the 
Fourteenth Amendment of  the U.S .  Constitution gives U . S .  citizen­
ship to anyone born in the U nited States, including the children o f  
nonimmigrants. 1�3 Thus, guest-worker programs in  the United States 
cannot create the type of caste society that they might in countries 
that do not  provide this b irthright citizenship. Furthermore, citizen­
ship for the children of immigrants has proven to be consistent with 
the national economic interest .  as the available evidence indicates 
1 40.  T h e  A FL-CIO has urged whis t le-blower pro tect ions and amnesty f o r  unauthorize d  
i m m igrants w h o  complain about substa ndard work i ng conditions or  other  v i o l at ions .  See 
C l e c l and. supru nok 1 1 4 .  at  A l :  Fran k  Swoboda. Unions Re verse on Illegal A liens; Policv Seeks 
A11 1nesrv. End ro Sane/ions. WASI-l. POST. Feb.  1 7 .  2000. at  A I .  
l -l l .  St'e S t e rn .  supru no te 1 1 5 .  at A I .  
1 42. Sec Lauri<e Goering.  Bush Considering Gn't'n Cur d  · · Poin ts ·· i\1exiwns Paying Taxes 
Cuuld Sru v.  CHI .  T R i lL A ug. 22. 20U l .  a t  1 :  Er ic Schmitt. !vu ;\gree1 11enr Yer ll"illi l'vlexico on 
!nunigmtiun Pian, U.S. Savs. N.Y .  T i i'v!ES.  Sept.  l .  2 i l( ) \ .  a t  A l .  
1 -+3.  See U . S .  CONST. amend. XIV. s 1 ( "A l l  persons born o r  natur a l ized i n  the U nited 
S tates .  and subject to the jurisdict ion thereof.  are ci tizens of  the U n ited States and o f  the State 
I\' he 1·c i n  they reside . . .  ) . 
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that the descendants of even unskilled immigrants have a positive 
fiscal impact, even taking into account the cost of publ ic education. 1 -l-l 
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker 's  resi­
dence and employment in the U ni ted States, however, the program 
raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with only re­
stricted access to citizenship. 1 -l5 Liberal obj ections to this prospect 
help explain some of the political resistance to expansion of these 
guest-worker programs. Woodward obj ects that · ' [ t ]he creation of a 
class of permanent residents who are restricted from becoming 
citizens (if they should wish to do so) or any similar system of differ­
entia l  status among a state ' s  permanent inhabitants is fundamentally 
incompatible with liberal egalitarian ideals .  " 1 40 As  Carens and others 
have argued, however, the exclusion of al iens is also incompatible 
with these ideals . 147 If  political realities require us to choose between 
these two departures from our liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can 
Woodward j ustify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the 
alien as well as on natives? 
Ironically, Woodward himself notes that  i f  we act against a 
" 'background of non-ideal institutions and behaviour" in a world " " in 
which large numbers of people and institutions fai l  to do what justice 
requires, " '  we may '" acquire obl igations which are different from those 
[we] would acquire under more perfectly j ust institutional arr ange­
ments . " 1-Jx As  Woodward states the theory of the second-best: 
[ t  is n o t  i n  general a defensible moral princ ip le  that i f  i t  is  obl iga­
tory (or even a good thing) t o  do P u n der ideal ,  utopian circum­
stances, then i t  is  also ob ligatory (or even a good th ing)  to do P 
under the actua l  circumstan ces,  no matter how far they may di ffer 
from the i d e a l . 1 -l'J 
Goodin notes that " [t]here is much to be said for the real ist argument 
that insists upon "the importance of not making a fetish of moral 
ideals ,"  because "doing the best you can in an imperfect world may 
well require you to compromise any ( indeed,  a l l )  of your moral 
1 44. See NRC supm note 68. a t  329 ( " [T]he present value of the descendants c)f a current 
immigrant . . i s  a lways posit ive.  regardless of the immigrant's age a t  arrival  and e ducation 
leve l . " ) .  
1 45. S e e  M unoz. supm n o t e  1 34. a t  M3. 
1 46.  Woodward. supra n o t e  4 0 .  a t  82. 
l 47. See supm note 38. 
1 -tH .  Woodward,  supra note 4U. at  78. 
l 49. !d. a t  77:  see Carens.  supra note 1 5 .  a t  45 ('" Ideals  do n o t  a!11·avs t ran s la t e d i rectly into 
prescriptions for practice because of the second-best problems famil i a r  from economic thc: on· 
which have the i r ana logue in  moral theory . " ) .  
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ideals" and a " (f] ailure t o  take due account o f  the probable reactions 
of others can . . .  have consequences that are truly catastrophic . " 1 511 
Woodward advances realist claims in  defense of immigration re­
strictions, but as we have seen,  they could more p lausibly j ustify 
restrictions on al ien access to p ubl ic  benefits and to citizenship. 
I ndeed, Woodward himself notes that " i t  is far from obvious that i t  
would be wrong . . .  to l imit eligibility for social  welfare programmes 
to citizens or long-term residents ,  if failure to do so would j eopardize 
the continued existence of such programmes. " 1 5 1  We might say the 
same about restrictions on al ien access to public benefits and citizen­
ship if these restrictions are n ecessary to make politically feasible the 
alien's access to our l abor market and the al ien's admission in the first 
p lace. 
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal  
alternatives, both of which fall short of our moral ideals .  In  this 
regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over deonto­
logical theories. Under a teleological theory, " those inst i tutions and 
acts are right which of the available alternatives produce the most 
good . " 1 52 Once we specify the good , then a teleological theory can 
provide a complete ranking of a l l  a l ternatives, including non-ideal 
alternatives . 1 53 Deontological theories ,  which do not maximize a good 
specified in advance, 1 54 may not readily provide a ranking of non - ideal 
altern a tives . l ' 5 
We might, for example ,  specify the good as an appropriate meas­
ure of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of preferences but 
excluding those preferences that  violate our liberal principles of 
equal ity. Ronald Dworkin ,  for example, has proposed such a teleo­
logical theory. 1 5" If  we apply this type of consequential ism and adopt 
a cosmopolitan perspective , then a guest-worker program represents 
the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclu­
sion. Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its 
150 .  Goodin. supra note 5'J.  a t  255 .  
1 5 1 .  Woodward. supra note 40.  at  79.  
1 52 .  RA WLS. supm note 1 8 . a t  24 .  
1 53. See ROB I N  B O A D W A Y  & N E l L  E RUCT. W ELFA R E  ECONO!vi iCS  3- 1  ( I 'J8-I ) (de fin ing a 
· ·complete · ·  ordering) :  J O H N  VON N E U !v! A N N  & 0 S K A R  M ORGENSTERN.  T H E O R Y  OF G A � I ES 
."\ N D  ECONO 'v ! I C  B E H A V I O R  26 (3d eel .  1 95 3 )  (same ) .  
1 5 -1. See RAWLS.  supra note 1 8 . a t  30. 
1 55.  See id. at 303 (suggest ing that · ·we may be able to find no satisfactory answer a t  a l l " '  in  
· · instances of nonidea l  theory"' ) .  
1 56. See D W O R K I N .  supra note 2 1. at 23-1-38. I have out l ined a s imi lar t heory. which I ca l l  
· · J iber<11 consequent ia l i sm. "' See Chang. SUJJra n ote 1 28.  at l 95-06. 
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distribution, whereas a guest-worker program would improve social 
welfare on both counts. From this perspective, liberal opposition to 
guest-worker policies i s  harmful and misguided, because the alterna­
tive of exclusion raises even worse moral problems from the perspec­
tive of our liberal principles of equality. 
Exclusion may benefit some workers in the country of immigra­
tion , but only at the expense of others in the country of immigration 
and at the expense of alien workers who are even worse off than the 
beneficiaries of the policy of exclusion. Thus, the employment 
discrimination implied by a pol icy of exclusion is difficult to j ustify 
from a cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are 
poorer than the workers who are privileged by this discriminatory 
regime. From this perspective , redistribution designed to compensate 
the workers adversely affected by immigration may itself bring about 
a desirable reduction in global inequality or may be necessary to 
soften the political opposition to liberalized immigration. but th is  
redistribution is not strictly necessary for immigration liberalization 
to be an improvement over the status quo. In terms of cosmopolitan 
l iberal ideals ,  the increase in global welfare and the improvement in 
i ts distribution created by liberalization itself would be sufficient to 
just ify liberalization whether or not  transfers compensate na tive 
workers for the erosion of the privileged status conferred by restric­
tionist policies. 
CONCLU S fON 
The employment discrimination against al iens implied by our 
immigration restrictions is difficult to j ustify,  whether we adopt the 
cosmopolitan perspective or instead embrace less egalitarian l iberal 
ideals and favor the interests of nat ives over those of aliens.  Consid­
erations of both global economic welfare and national economic 
welfare militate in  favor of l iberaLized alien access to our labor 
markets. In  the case of  skilled aliens, the United States can lift 
restrictions on the employment o f  aliens consistent with the nat ional 
interest by liberalizing access to employment-based immigrant visas 
for skil led workers. In  the case of unsk i l led aliens, however. the 
optimal policy from the perspective of the interests of natives departs 
significantly from the pol icy prescribed by cosmopolitan ideals .  
While the employment discrimination implied by our immigration 
restrictions remains difficult to j ustify ,  some discrimin ation against 
unski l led aliens in the distribution of public benefi ts and in access to 
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citizenship may serve the interests of natives. These considerations 
militate in  favor of guest-worker programs as policies tha t  provide 
access to our l abor markets without necessarily providing full access 
to the transfers provided to citizens. 
While guest-worker programs may be ideal from the perspective 
of the economic welfare of natives, they are only second-best policies 
from the cosmopolitan perspective. The cosmopolitan l iberal would 
prefer that aliens have access to both our labor market and ready 
access to public benefits and citizenship. As a matter of polit ical 
reality, however, natives are unlikely to admit aliens under those 
generous conditions in the numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would 
require, given the fiscal burden that those liberal pol icies  would 
entail .  Given this constraint of political  feasibility, cosmopolitan 
l iberals face a trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor 
markets for unskil led alien workers will  l ikely require some restric­
tions in  access to public benefi ts and citizenship to h ave a realistic 
chance of enactment. From a consequentialist perspective that  
extends equal  concern to a l iens and natives, guest-worke r  programs 
are less unj ust than the status quo alternative of exclusion. Reforms 
that reduce employment d iscrimination against al iens should prove 
feasible, even while eliminating all  discrimination against al iens 
remains an unrealistic ideal .  Therefore,  I have suggested, cosmopoli­
tan liberals should support l iberalizing reforms that include guest­
worker programs,  even while seeking the broadest rights possible for 
aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While i t  would be 
a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal 
egalitarian perspective. i t  would also be a mistake to sacrifice worth­
while reforms because they fall short of the ideal .  
